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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Reserving the argument that this Court may not have jurisdiction over this matter, 
this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE 
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS PREMATURELY FILED. The Standard of 
Review concerning whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law. 
State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991). 
II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES DID 
NOT INTEND TO DISSOLVE THE ORDER FOR SEPARATE 
MAINTENANCE AND THAT THEY HAD NOT EFFECTUATED A 
COMPLETE AND VOLUNTARY RECONCILIATION AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 30-4-3(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. The Standard of Review is 
that findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORDER OF 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE WAS AN ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENT. The 
Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. 
Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989). 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT FACIO FAILED TO 
PERFORM CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE POTENTIAL 
RECONCILIATION. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce 
appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989). 
VI. THE PROPERTY DIVISION CLAIMS ARE ESSENTIALLY MOOT BASED 
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ON THE FACT THAT THEY WERE EXECUTED UNDER THE ORDER OF 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in 
divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (UtahApp. 
1989). 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. The Standard of Review is that trial courts have 
considerable discretion in determining alimony and property distributions in 
divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion 
is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (UtahApp. 1988). 
VIII. THE APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL. The standard is that in divorce cases, "Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable in an action is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness." 
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs.. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Generally, the prevailing party on appeal in divorce cases is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. Marhsall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes the Appellee believes are determinative in this appeal and 
are attached hereto in the Addendum: 30-4-3 and 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
W. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On August 11,1992, Burge filed a Complaint for an Order of Separate 
Maintenance. R. 1-8 (hereinafter referred to as "the Order"). 
2. Facio executed an Acceptance of Service, Consent and Waiver. R. 9-10. 
3. On August 29, 1992, the Court entered the Order. R. 12-24. 
4. On October 7, 1997, Burge filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce. R. 27-37. 
2 
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5. On November 7, 1997, Facio filed a Pro Se answer. R. 45-47. 
6. On December 24, 1998, Burge filed a Motion to Bifurcate the action. R. 192. 
7. On December 29, 1998, Facio filed his consent to bifurcate. R. 213. 
8. On March 19, 1999, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. R. 243-247. 
9. The case goes to trial on May 30, 2000. R. 282. 
10. On April 19, 2001, the Court enters its Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce. R. 307-340. 
11. Facio files an Objection to the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on April 25, 2001. R. 343-345. 
12. On May 18,2001, Facio filed his Notice of Appeal. R. 347-348. 
13. On June 13, 2001, the Court entered its Second Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law and Amended Decree of Divorce. R. 350-384. 
X. FACTUAL HISTORY 
1. Burge and Facio were married on March 16, 1974. R. 1. 
2. The parties had two children, Ashley, born March 31, 1980 and a minor, Paul, 
born April 20, 1987. R. 1. 
3. The parties separated initially on May 16, 1991. R. 1 
4. On August 11,1992, Burge filed a complaint for separate maintenance. R. 1-8. 
5. The Court entered the Order on August 28, 1992. R. 12-24. 
3 
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6. Burge filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce on October 7, 1997. R. 27-37. 
7. The case was tried in a one day trial before the Honorable Judge Bohling on 
May 30, 2000, with only Burge and Facio as witnesses. See generally Trial Transcript, R. 
387. 
Burge Direct Examination 
8. Since moving to Utah, Burge was continually employed. TT. P. 12-13. 
9. Facio's employment history was changeable. TT.P. 13 L 5 to P. 16 L9. 
10. The parties owned the Live Oak and the E Street homes. TT. P. 21, L. 6-19. " 
11. The Live Oak residence was titled solely in Burge's name and the debt thereon 
was solely in her name. TT. P. 22, L. 8-15. 
12. The down payment of the Live Oak home came from Burge's separate assets. 
TT.P.34,L. 12 to P. 35, L. 4. 
13. After 1989, Facio contributed very little financially. TT. P. 24, L. 13-16. 
14. Facio surreptititiously depleted family assets, including IRAs and his 
daughter's college fund. TT. P. 25 L. 24 to P. 29, L. 15. 
15. In 1991, Burge discovered that Facio had not filed the parties' taxes. Burge 
filed separately and has had done so since. TT. P. 25, L. 1-10. 
16. Burge did not complete the 1991 divorce because Facio asked her for a legal 
separation thereby dividing up their assets and liabilities but maintaining the marriage. 
TT.P.30,L. 1-14. 
4 
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17. Facio told Burge he was represented by Mr. Barnard. TT. P. 19 L. 8 - TT. P. 
20 L. 10. 
18. The parties agreed the Order completely divided their assets. TT. P. 44 L. 15-
17 Burge quit claimed the E Street house to Facio and it was sold. Burge was given a 
portion of the equity as restitution for the money Facio had taken dishonestly and other 
expenses. Facio retained the rest. TT. P. 39 L. 1-24. 
19. Burge was awarded the Live Oak home. TT. P. 37 L 9-11. Burge invested 
her portion of the E Street home equity into her Live Oak home. TT. P. 56 L 15 - TT. P. 
57 L.5. 
20. Each party was awarded their own retirement account. TT.P. 40-L. 10-24. 
21. Facio cashed out and spent his retirement. TT. P.41, L.2-17. 
22. Burge paid the debts she was ordered to pay. TT. P. 45 L. 3-4. 
23. Since 1991, Burge maintained separate banking accounts. TT. P. 46, L. 21 - P. 
47. L. 7. 
24. Burge identified a letter from Facio dated March 1993 wherein he promised to 
do certain things and, if competed, they would get back together. These included paying 
taxes, paying bills on time and remaining monogamous. TT. P. 89, L. 1 - TT. P. 90 L. 
and the letter is in the record at R. 137 (hereinafter "the Letter.") 
25. In the Letter, Facio made promises to change his conduct and requested the 
parties agree to mutually attend counseling to address issues including "deciding on 
5 
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remarriage." R. 137. 
26. Burge even responded to Facio in writing: "Lets do this but not as a married 
couple. As the parents of two wonderfiil kids who need responsible parents - as people 
who are kind to each other - but not involved with each other." R. 137. 
27. After the entry of the Order, Facio moved back into the Live Oak house. This 
conditional move back into the residence was based on Facio's agreement to, among 
other things, pay his taxes, his bills on time and not date other people. TT. P. 49 L. 23 -
TTP50L. 13 andR. 137. " 
28. Burge believed the Letter meant that if Facio lived up to his promises and they 
went to counseling they could be as husband and wife again, but said they "were never 
able to get to that point." TT P 90 LI7-23. 
29. Facio failed to perform the conditions. He had relationships with other 
women, he did not pay his taxes and he did not pay his bills. TT. P. 50 L 14 - TT. P. 51 L. 
23. 
30. During the time Facio was back in the home, Facio repeatedly told Burge the 
Order was there for her protection. TT. P. 45, L. 20-24. 
31. The parties treated the order as though it was still in effect. TT. P. 46, L. 19-
21. 
32. In 1994 Facio agreed to pay child support as ordered. TT. P. 53, L. 8-14. 
33. Burge stated that she asked her company's personnel director if she 
6 
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could carry Facio on her insurance while legally separated. P. 97 L. 2- 19. 
34. On June 28, 1996, Burge received a letter from Sears apologizing for listing 
her name on Facio's Sears account, which was removed when Facio informed Sears that 
they were legally separated. TT. P. 96, L. 4-18. 
35. Burge testified concerning Exhibit No 36 which was Facio's Consumer Credit 
Counseling application wherein he did not list Burge as his wife, did not list any 
household or joint obligation, and enlisted Consumer Credit Counseling's assistance 
solely for his own personal debts and obligations. TT. P. 99, L. 1-25. 
36. All improvements to the Live Oak property were paid by Burge. TT. P. 56 L. 
15-TT.P. 57L8. 
37. Burge paid all the household expenses and expenses for the children. TT. P. 
22, L. 16-21 
38. From 1994 to 1997, Facio contributed only $5,600 to the family. TT. 
P. 23, L. 9-15. 
39. Facio did not pay the debts nor the child support as ordered. TT. P.45, L. 7-12. 
40. Facio moved out of the residence in September 1997. TT. P. 54, L. 3-4. 
41. After Facio moved out, he did not pay any child support voluntarily. TT. P. 58, 
L. 14-21. 
42. Facio never paid his one half of the uninsured medical expenses. TT. P. 77. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43. Live Oak home was appraised in 1992 at $135,000 and again at the time of 
bifurcation at $216,000. TT. P. 84 L. 6 - TT. P. 85 L. 13. 
Burge Cross Examination 
44. When questioned about whether during the parties' entire marriage all of the 
property was titled solely in Burge's name, Burge informed the Court that the E Street 
home was jointly titled, as were some retirement accounts. TT. P. 116, L. 10-17. 
45. Burge did not enforce the terms of the Order relating to Facio's financial 
obligations to her. TT. P. 118 L. 20 to P. 120, L. 5. 
46. Facio moved back into the home after having written her the letter dated 
March 31st. TT. P. 129, L. 18 to P. 130, L. 1. 
47. Facio did not do any of the things he promised in the letter. TT. P. 130, L. 6-8. 
48. Based on the Order, the parties had divided everything. TT.P132,L24 to P 
133, L. 5. 
49. Burge took advantage of Facio's flight benefits after asking Facio if it was 
okay to do so while legally separated. TT. P. 137, L. 4-7. 
Burge Re-Direct Examination 
50. After the Order, Burge invested $30,000.00 in improvements to the Live Oak 
home from her separate funds. TT. P. 140, L. 4-10. 
51. After the Order, Burge paid down the principal on the note on the Live Oak 
home from her separate funds. TT. P. 140, L. 22-24. 
8 
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52. Facio owed $11,500.00 in back child support from the time of the Order until 
he moved back into the home. TT. P. 141, L. 5-8. 
53. Facio owed $4,000.00 in child support for Paul from September 1997 through 
June, 1999. TT. P. 141, L. 20-22. 
54. Facio owed $500.00 in child support for Ashley from September, 1997 
through June of 1998 when she turned 18 years old. TT. P. 141, L. 23 to P. 142, L. 2. 
55. Facio owed $1,000.00 for his portion of uninsured medical expenses for the 
minor children from September, 1997 forward. TT. P. 142, L. 3-11. 
56. Facio owed approximately $500.00 for day care for the parties minor son from 
September, 1997 forward. TT. P. 142, L. 13-16. 
57. When Facio moved out of the home in September, 1997 Burge gave him 
$4,800.00 to move out of the home which he promised to repay but that she knew he 
would not. TT. P. 142, L. 24 to P. 143, L. 9. 
Facio Direct Examination 
58. During the parties marriage, Facio was employed the entire time except of the 
period of 1989. TT. P. 146, L. 9-11. 
59. Facio was not represented by counsel at the time of the Order. TT. P. 152, L. 
2-4. 
60. Facio received $22,000.00 from the sale of the E Street property which he 
spent. TT.P. 152, L. 18-24. 
9 
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61. Burge got approximately $26,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of the E 
Street home. TT. P. 153, L. 8. 
62. Facio moved back into the Live Oak home around Thanksgiving, 1993. TT. 
P. 154, L. 21-23. 
63. After Facio moved back into the Live Oak home he never referred to the 
Order, because he "didn't think it existed. I just thought it went away, honestly." TT. P. 
155, L. 8-15. 
64. Once Facio moved back into the home, Burge pressured him to contribute 
money to the household. TT. P. 155, L. 19-24. 
65. Facio testified that he helped around the house. TT. P. 156, L. 1-12. 
66. In September, 1997 Facio was earning about $7.00 per hour but at the time of 
trial he was earning $12.85 per hour. TT. P. 159, L. 1-8. 
67. In response to the question of when Facio moved back into the Live Oak home 
were he and Burge living as man and wife, Facio stated, "Yeah, I thought we were-I 
thought we were, you know, on our way to reconciling." TT. P. 162, L. 5-8. 
68. Facio testified that nothing was different than it had been before. TT. P. 162, 
L. 9-11. 
Facio Cross Examination 
69. Facio first employed the services of Brian Barnard as his attorney in the 
1980's. TT.P. 166, L. 1. 
10 
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70. Facio consulted with Mr. Barnard about a variety of legal matters including 
the initial 1991 divorce proceeding. TT. P. 166, L. 4-6. 
71. Facio did not recall whether he discussed the divorce or separate maintenance 
action with Barnard. TT. P. 167, L. 6-13. 
72. Facio was aware that he could have sought legal counsel.TT. P. 167, L. 18-19. 
73. Facio had not filed tax returns since 1989. TT. P. 168, L. 5-9. 
74. Facio's income was provable ised on his W-2fs. TT. P. 168, L. 20-23. 
75. When Facio wrote the letter, he promised to change his behavior before the 
parties' lives could go on together. TT. P. 169, L. 11-13. 
76. Facio did not accomplish the changes he promised to make. TT PI70, L10-13. 
Facio Re-Direct Examination 
77. While living in the Live Oak home, Burge came up to Facio one day and said 
"Don't hurt me anymore." and asked him to put her wedding ring back on her hand. TT. 
P. 174, L. 11-14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the notice of appeal was 
prematurely filed. Burge believes that the lower correctly ruled on the issues before it 
and that this Court should affirm those rulings. Facio has completely failed to marshal 
the evidence. This Court must assume the correctness of those findings of fact. Further, 
the Court correctly applied the law in this case within the normal bounds of its discretion 
11 
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in property distribution cases of divorce. Finally, because the majority of the property 
issues contained in the Order of Separate Maintenance were executed, regardless of the 
lower court's determination of reconciliation, such provisions would not have in any way 
been impacted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS PREMATURELY FILED. 
This Court must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Facio's notice of 
appeal was prematurely filed and therefore of no effect to confer jurisdiction upon this 
Court. 
Following a trial in this action, the Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce on April 19, 2001. R. R. 307-
340. Facio filed a pleading entitled "Objection to Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" on April 25, 2001. R. 343-345. Specifically, Facio's objection in 
stated the following basis for his objection: 
3. Petitioner's counsel took 11 months to prepare the findings. 
4. The Petitioner submitted the findings without providing Respondent an opportunity to 
review them in violation of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. A 
Notice to Submit was included with the filing. 
5. The Respondent objects to nearly every paragraph of the 28 page document. The 
document does not represent the testimony, evidence presented or findings of fact that 
were made at the trial. 
6. Respondent requests a hearing in this matter. 
R. 343-345. On May 18, 2001, before the Court ruled on his objection, Facio filed his 
Notice of Appeal. R. 347-348. On June 13, 2001, the Court entered its Second Amended 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and Amended Decree of Divorce without 
objection from Facio. R. 350-384. 
Facio's objection did not recite the rule or legal basis upon which it was filed. 
Nonetheless, in Regan v. Blount. 978 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1999), the Court, in 
considering a motion to reconsider and objection to amended order and judgment, stated, 
"in essence, the appellant is seeking an amendment of the judgment and/or a new trial. 
Accordingly, the motion and objection will be treated as either a Rule 52(b) motion to 
amend the judgment or a Rule 59 motion for new trial, which, if timely, suspends the 
appeal period until entry of the order denying it." Id_ Facio's objection to should be 
treated as either a Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 Motion insofar as it requests an amendment of 
the order. R. 344. 
Assuming this Court does treat the objection as a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the 
judgment, said motion was filed within ten days of the date of the entry of the Amended 
Order making the motion timely. Because Facio filed a timely Rule 52(b) motion to 
amend the judgment, said motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal, thereby 
rendering "a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of such motion by entry of a signed 
order ineffective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court." Anderson v. 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah App. 1988). "To vest jurisdiction in the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal must be filed after the entry of the order disposing of 
such motions." Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994). 
13 
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Facio filed the notice of appeal before an order disposing of his post trial motion. 
Such a filing does not confer jurisdiction on this court. Therefore, this Court must 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiciton. 
After the filing of the objection, Second Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce were entered. These were sent to 
counsel for Facio on May 25, 2001 containing a Notice addressing the right to object to 
the order pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. No objection 
was filed. The only reasonable conclusion is that whatever objections Facio had with the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were resolved. The failure of Facio 
to object to these Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second 
Amended Decree of Divorce constituted a waiver of his earlier filed objection. 
It was then Facio's duty to file a notice of appeal from the entry of the final order, 
i.e. the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended 
Decree of Divorce within thirty days of the date of their entry. Facio did not. Therefore, 
not only does this Court lack jurisdiction based on the prematurely filed appeal which 
must result in dismissal, but that dismissal must be with prejudice because the time to file 
a new notice of appeal has run. 
II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant has challenged many of the factual findings made by the trial court. To 
establish clear error and thereby merit reversal, an appellant must marshal the evidence in 
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support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
"Successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate courts how the 
trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such findings contradict the 
weight of the evidence." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872 
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). Where an appellant challenges findings of fact, but 
fails to marshal the evidence as required, this Court must "refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989). 
Appellant has not even remotely attempted to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings. He has simply argued some of the disputed evidence which he 
believes supports his position. This Court must accept the findings as valid. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES 
DID NOT INTEND TO DISSOLVE THE ORDER OF SEPARATE 
MAINTENANCE AND THAT THEY HAD NOT EFFECTUATED A 
COMPLETE AND VOLUNTARY RECONCILIATION AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 30-4-3(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The District Court correctly found that the parties had not reconciled. The 
Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
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(UtahApp. 1989). 
The Court found that the Order of Separate Maintenance was not dissolved when 
the parties lived together. Specifically, the Court first noted that pursuant to Section 30-
4-3(3), Utah Code Annotated that it could change the provisions of an Order for Separate 
Maintenance and may terminate the order altogether "upon satisfactory proof of voluntary 
and permanent reconciliation." The Court then examined two prongs of the analysis 
including (1) was it the intention of the parties to dissolve the order of separate 
maintenance and (2) was there satisfactory proof of a voluntary and permanent 
reconciliation. TT. P. 20 to P. 191, L. 2. 
The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, is in the best position to resolve 
disputed testimony. On review, appellate courts are "obliged to view the evidence and all 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the findings of the 
trier of fact. The findings and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when they 
are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence." Nupetco Associates v. 
Jenkins.. 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983) (quoting Car Doctor. Inc. v. Belmont. Utah, 635 P.2d 
82, 83-84 (1981)). There was substantial, competent, admissible evidence which 
supported the trial court's finding concerning the parties' intentions regarding the 
dissolution of the Order. Burge testified that it was never the intention of the parties to 
dissolve this Order. See TT. P. 45, L. 20-24 & P. 46, L. 19-21. In contrast, Facio 
testified that he assumed that once he moved back into the home, the Order was done. 
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See TT. P. 155, L. 8-15. The trial court, sitting as the finder of facts appropriately 
weighed the credibility of the witnesses. Yelderman v. Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406, 408 
(Utah 1983) ("it is within the province of the fact finder to believe those witnesses or 
evidence it chooses"). Based on its role as the finder of fact, the Court made its findings 
based on substantial, competent admissible evidence that it was not the intentions of the 
parties to dissolve the order of separate maintenance. 
The trial court further found by their conduct that the parties had not reconciled but 
merely attempted a reconciliation. This too was supported by substantial, competent 
admissible evidence. Burge permitted Facio to move into the home solely based on his 
conditional promises to make changes that if effectuated would permit the parties to 
attempt a reconciliation. See TT. P. 50, L. 6-13; P. 89, L. 1-19; R. 137; P. 129, L. 18 to P. 
130, L. 1. Facio admitted that Burge permitted him to move back into the home based on 
his March 31st letter wherein he promised to make certain behavioral changes. TT. P. 90, 
L. 17-23; P. 169, L. 11-13. Both Burge and Facio admitted that Facio never made those 
promised changes upon which any future reconciliation would be based. TT. P. 51 L. 15-
23; P. 90, L. 23; P. 130, L. 6-8; and P. 170, L. 10-13. 
Utah case law is virtually non-existent on the issue of the impact of reconciliation 
on an Order for Separate Maintenance. First, whether a reconciliation occurred is a 
finding of fact. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 P. 168 (Utah 1919). In Lund v. Lund, 315 
P.2d 856 (Utah 1957), the Court in discussing the impact of reconciliation on an 
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interlocutory decree, stated, "the order set aside and vacated the interlocutory decree for 
the reasons that the parties had become reconciled and any misconduct giving ground for 
the said interlocutory decree had been condoned and forgiven and the reconciliation was 
without any condition and the subsequent misconduct complained of did not revive the 
i 
interlocutory decree." Id Lund implicitely adopts a position that reconciliation does not 
occur where there are conditions precedent to its completion which go unperformed. 
Such was true in the instant case. 
A survey of the law of other jurisdictions reveals that the majority rule is that 
whether a reconciliation occurred is a matter of the parties intentions.l Thus, while Utah 
has not ruled on this issue, it should follow the majority of those jurisdictions which have 
determining that whether a reconciliation has been completed is a factual question 
hinging on the parties'intentions. 
In the instant case, the Court heard disputed testimony concerning the parties' 
intentions regarding any potential reconciliation. It was within the trial court's discretion 
to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and make its findings based thereon. So long as 
those findings were supported by substantial competent admissible evidence, on appeal 
such findings must be upheld. The Court had substantial, competent, and credible 
'See e.g. Muschesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21,26 (Az. App. Div. 1 1997); Morgan v. Morgan, 
234 P.2d 782, 784 (Cal. 1951); In re: Marriage of Reeser. 635 P.2d 930, 932 (Co. App. 1981); Wood v. 
Wood. 309 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. App. 1973); Prime v. Dring. 956 P.2d 1301, 1308 (Hawaii App. 1998); 
Miller v. Miller. 616 P.2d 313, 316 (Mont. 1980); Brazina v. Brazina. 558 A.2d 69, 71 (N.J. Super. Ch. 
1989); Young v. Young. 34 S.E.2d 154,156 (NC 1945); and Roberts v. Pace. 67 S.E.2d 844 (Va 1951). 
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evidence upon which it based its determination that no reconciliation was effectuated. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORDER OF 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE WAS AN ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENT. 
The District Court correctly found that the Order of Separate Maintenance was an 
arms length agreement. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce 
appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Court made the following statement on the record concerning this issue: 
The Court finds that the order was entered into at arm's length by two educated, sophisticated 
people. Whether or not Mr. Facio ever asked Mr. Barnard to review the matter is unclear to the 
Court, but certainly he knew of Mr. Barnard, he had referred to him in the past and had every 
opportunity to do so. 
It's the Court's view that there's no suggestion of undue influence or anything inappropriate in 
that agreement, and looking at it on the face of it, it is fair and seems to be evenhanded, and 
something that would have been structured between two parties represented by Counsel, 
attempting to work out a fair relationship between the two of them." TT. P. 192, L. 12-23. 
A transaction between spouses is generally not judged by the same standards 
which apply to nonrelated parties. Nonetheless, such transactions are enforced, if the 
parties operated with "the highest degree of good faith, honesty, and candor in connection 
with the negotiation and execution of such agreements." In re Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 
1347 (Utah 1994) (quoting Huckv.Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)). The Court 
perhaps mislabeled the transaction as being one at "arm's length" meaning in this context 
that the transaction was negotiated, executed and performed in good faith, honesty and 
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candor. Any mislabeling of the transaction was harmless error.2 
Y. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT FACIO FAILED 
TO PERFORM CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE POTENTIAL 
RECONCILIATION. 
The District Court correctly found that Facio failed to perform his promised 
conditions precedent to the parties potential reconciliation. Even assuming arguendo that 
the parties had entered into a present agreement to reconcile, "When one party to a valid 
contract commits an "uncured material failure' in its performance of the contract, the 
non-failing party is relieved of its duty to continue to perform under the contract." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §237(1981). Failure of a material condition 
precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform. See 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 628, at 16 (1960) and § 630, at 20-21. Based on the foregoing 
substantial, competent admissible evidence, the Court correctly found that the promises 
were a condition precedent to a reconciliation which conditions were never met or 
performed by Facio. TT. P. 191, L. 9-19. 
Facio's testimony alone supports this finding by the Court. He admitted that his 
move back into the home was conditional. TT. P. 162, L 5-8. Facio further admitted that 
he didn't perform the promised conditions. TT. P. 170, L. 10-13. Burge's testimony as 
noted above further supported the Court's conclusion. 
2Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) ('"Harmless error' is defined . . . as 
an error that is 'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989))) 
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VI. THE PROPERTY DIVISION CLAIMS ARE ESSENTIALLY MOOT 
BASED ON THE FACT THAT THEY WERE EXECUTED UNDER THE 
ORDER OF SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. 
The property division claims are essentially moot based on the fact that they were 
executed under the order of separate maintenance. The Standard of Review concerning 
whether the order provisions were executed is a mixed question of fact and law which this 
Court review's the trial court's legal conclusion for correctness and its factual findings for 
clear error. State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Utah 1997). 
The majority of cases involving Orders for Separate Maintenance Agreements and 
reconciliation hold one thing uniformly. To the extent that any of the provisions of an 
Order for Separate Maintenance are executed, they remain enforceable regardless of the 
subsequent conduct of the parties.3 Because the majority of the property provisions in the 
Order were executed, any subsequent conduct by the parties (including reconciliation) 
were irrelevant to those provisions. 
Burge believes that the following provisions were completely executed at or soon 
after the entry of the Order4: 
2. Awarding Burge the Live Oak residence (R. 19-20); 
3. Sale of the E Street residence and division of proceeds ( R-20); 
3See Muchesko v. Muchesko. 955 P.2d 21 (Az. App. 1997); Morgan v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 782 
(Cal. 1951); In re: Marriage of Reeser. 635 P.2d 930 (Co. 1981); Cox v. Cox. 659 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 
1995); Miller v. Miller. 616 P.2d 313 (Mont. 1980); Brazina v. Brazina. 588 P.2d 69 (NJ Super. Ch. 
1989; Schultzv. Schultz. 420 SE2d 186 (NC App. 1992); Bourne v. Bourne. 521 SE2d 519 (SC App. 
1999); Yeich v. Yeich. 399 SE2d 170 (Va App. 1990); and Kaminskv v. Kaminskv. 364 SE2d 799 (W. 
Va. 1987). 
4The paragraph numbers following correspond to the paragraph numbering of the Order. 
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4. Personal Property division (R-20); 
5. Automobile Division (R-20); 
6. Burge awarded her stocks and securities (R-20); 
7. Burge awarded IRA accounts and savings bonds (R-20); 
8. Each party awarded their own retirement accounts (R-21); 
17. Division of Debts (R-23); 
19. Burge permitted to change her name to Burge (if she had ever been known as Facio)(R-
24). 
The executed portions of the Order were done. Any conduct by the parties was of 
no effect on these provisions of the Order. 
The majority of the remaining provisions of the Order could be said to be 
unexecuted. These provisions either were not contested in the divorce proceeding (i.e. 
paragraph 10 relating to custody of the minor children) or resolved by statute (paragraph 
11-Child Support; paragraph 12-children's medical expenses; paragraph 13-children's 
medical insurance; paragraph 14-child support obligor's life insurance; paragraph 15-day 
care expenses). Finally, there are two provisions which then remain unresolved 
(paragraph 16-liability for individual debts after the date of the parties separation; 
paragraph 18-allocation of state and federal tax exemptions).5 As argued below, the 
Court's division of the marital estate which closely paralleled the Order was not an abuse 
of its discretion. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
The District Court correctly equitably divided the marital estate. The Standard of 
5These final two provisions were in fact partially executed during the period the parties lived 
separately after the entry of the Order, but admittedly could have been considered unexecuted by the 
Court for any period after Facio again resided in the Live Oak residence. 
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Review is that trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and 
property distributions in divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The Court's division of property was supported by substantial, competent and 
admissible evidence. Facio challenges only those provisions of the Decree which relate 
to Real Property, Burge's Retirement, Alimony, and Furniture. Specifically, the Court 
adopted much of the Order.6 The differences are set forth below: 
Order Decree 
1. Burge gets Live Oak House/ 1. Each get same interest awarded in 
Each party awarded their proceeds the Order; 
from the sale of the E Street house; 
2. Each party awarded their own retirement; 2. Each get same interest awarded in 
the Order; 
3. Neither party awarded alimony 3. Neither party awarded alimony; 
4. Each awarded the personal property in 4. Each get same interest awarded the 
in their possession; Order. 
This division was supported by the evidence. Burge testified extensively that the 
Live Oak home was purchased with her separate funds for a down payment, that she paid 
the mortgage payments and she paid for all of the improvements. TT. P. 34, L. 12- P. 35, 
L. 4; P. 22, L. 8-15; P. 56, L. 1-23. Facio and Burge testified that each was awarded their 
own retirement account. TT. P. 40,1. 10-24. Both testified that Facio spent the proceeds 
of his account. TT. P. 41, L. 2-17. It would be completely inequitable to permit Facio to 
6Burge believes that all of these issues were executed portions of the Order except the alimony 
provision. 
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spend his retirement account and then compel Burge to divide hers. Burge testified that 
she was awarded the furniture, it was still in her possession and that no new personal 
property had been acquired after the date the parties lived together again. TT. P. 44, L. 21 
to P. 45, L. 2. 
Finally, the court properly denied the parties' alimony.7 While there was evidence 
before the Court concerning the parties incomes, there was no evidence before the Court 
concerning the other factors set forth in Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended). If these factors have been considered8, '"we will not disturb the trial court's 
alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
In the absence of such matters being introduced into evidence, there was no basis for the 
Court to award either party alimony. 
VIII. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD BURGE HER ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
This Court should award Burge her attorney fees on appeal. There is no basis for 
this appeal either in law or in fact. Burge believes that if she substantially prevails on 
appeal, she should be awarded her attorney fees. Generally, the prevailing party on 
appeal in divorce cases is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Marhsall v. Marshall. 915 
7It is worth noting that Facio did not file a counterclaim in this action. He did not affirmatively 
request the trial court award him alimony. Therefore he was not entitled to an award of alimony below. 
8It is improper for the Court to consider matters not introduced into evidence. 
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P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
Facio's appeal was untimely filed. This Court lacks jurisdiction. It must dismiss 
this appeal with prejudice. Facio has failed to marshall the evidence. This Court must 
adopt the trial court's findings of fact. Facio received an equitable share of the marital 
estate from the Order of Separate Maintenance including all of his retirement, $22,000.00 
in cash from equity in a home and other personal items. The trial court properly found 
that the parties did not reconcile and that the Order was not dissolved. The majority of 
the property issues contained in the Order were executed and therefore not impacted in 
anyway by the parties' conduct subsequent to their execution. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in the manner in which it divided the remaining marital estate. This 
Court should affirm the trial court's findings, conclusions and decree. 
Dated and Signed this {3_ day of y^OQ^ 2001 
ower 
ey for Petitioner/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this the | ^ d a y of J>Q&i , 2001,1 caused two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document to be mailedto the person named 
below, first class postage prepaid: J H ^ 
Mr. David P. Larson 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE, 
WADE & SMART 
341 South Main Street, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
The following are attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as 
Addendum to Appellee's Brief: 
Statutes: 
30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
Documents 
Order for Separate Maintenance 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Amended Decree of Divorce 
Objection 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law 
Second Amended Decree of Divorce 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obUgations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties, separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated Dy the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
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(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been fjreatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court maty consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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30-4-3, Custody and maintenance of children — Property 
and debt division — Support payments. 
(1) In all actions brought under this chapter the court may by order or 
decree: 
(a) provide for the care, custody, and maintenance of the minor children 
of the parties and may determine with which of the parties the children or 
any of them shall remain; 
(b) (i) provide for support of either spouse and the support of the minor 
children remaining with that spouse; 
(ii) provide how and when support payments shall be made; and 
(iii) provide that either spouse have a lien upon the property of the 
other to secure payment of the support or maintenance obligation; 
(c) award to either spouse the possession of any real or personal 
property of the other spouse or acquired by the spouses during the 
marriage; or 
(d) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: ! 
(i) specify which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities contracted or incurred by the parties during 
the marriage; 
(ii) require the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, and liabilities and 
regarding the parties , separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provide for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The orders and decrees under this section may be enforced by sale of any 
property of the spouse or by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may be 
necessary. 
(3) The court may change the support or maintenance of a party from time 
to time according to circumstances, and may terminate altogether any obliga-
tion upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation. An 
order or decree of support or maintenance shall in every case be valid only 
during the joint lives of the husband and wife. 
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AUG 2 8 1992 
Louise T. Knauer, #4066 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (FACIO), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, 
Defendant• 
im&wr ORDER FOR 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE 
Civil No.: 924903403SM 
Judge: John A. 
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable John A. Rokich on 
August 25, 1992, at the hour of 9:10 a.m. Plaintiff was present 
in Court and represented by counsel, Louise T. Knauer. Defendant 
was not present in Court. The Court noted that the Defendant had 
executed an Acceptance of Service Consent and Waiver agreeing to 
the terras contained in the Complaint for Separate Maintenance filed 
herein. 
Upon the basis of record herein, and pursuant to the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in this matter, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded an Order for Separate Maintenance 
to become final upon signing and entry. 
2. During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff acquired a home 
located at 2869 Live Oak Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff 
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used non-marital assets and a loan from her mother for the down 
payment on the home. The home, including all reserve accounts 
associated therewith, is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property subject to her assuming the obligations for the 
mortgage. 
3. The parties acquired real property located at 318 E 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff quit-claimed that property 
to Defendant prior to its sale. That property has been sold, and 
the parties have divided the net proceeds in a manner which is fair 
and equitable. Each party is awarded the sum he or she received 
as sole, separate property, subject to no claim from the other. 
4. The personal property of the parties is av/arded in a 
manner which the parties determine to be fair and equitable. 
5. Defendant is awarded the 1990 Honda Civic automobile, 
subject to debt thereon, and is ordered to indemnify and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. Plaintiff is av/arded the 1936 Toyota 
Van. The Van is collateral for a debt incurred by Defendant. 
Within six months of the signing of the Acceptance of Service, 
Consent and Waiver, Defendant is ordered to pay off the loan 
secured by the Van, and provide Plaintiff v/ith title to the Van. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded all stocks and other securities in 
Plaintiff's name. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded all I.R.A. accounts and all savings 
bonds in her name, and the I.R.A. account presently held jointly. 
2 
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8. Each party is awarded the retirement accounts in his or 
her name. 
9. Each party is fully capable of supporting hin or herself. 
Therefore no award of alimony is made to either party. 
10. Both parties are fit and proper persons to be awarded 
joint legal custody of the minor children of the parties and it is 
fair and reasonable that the parties be awarded joint legal custody 
of the minor children. ' Plaintiff has been the primary caretaker 
of the children, and it is in the best interest of the children 
that she be awarded their physical custody, subject to reasonable 
and liberal visitation in Defendant. 
11. Defendant is ordered to pay child support to Plaintiff 
in the amount of $250 each month, until September 1, 1992. For the 
period September 1992 through September 1993, Defendant is ordered 
to pay child support in the amount of $500. These sums shall 
include payment of Defendant'r. obligation to assist in payment ol 
day care for the children. Each party is ordered to provide 
his/her tax returns and documentation concerning business expenses 
to the other on or before May 31 of each year, beginning in 1993. 
Aftc:i said documentation has been exchanged, it is ordered that the 
child support figure be reevaluated, based on the parties1 incomes. 
In the event that the parties can not reach an agreement on the 
child support amounc, the matter may be brought before the Court 
in an Order to Show Cause proceeding, and the parties will not need 
3 
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to file a Petition to Modify to adjust child support. The support 
for each child must continue until that child should die, marry, 
or reach the age of majority and finish high school, whichever 
event first occurs- Defendant is ordered to pay his child support 
obligation by the first of each month. 
12. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the routine medical expenses 
for the children. Each party is ordered to be responsible for one-
half of the payment of extraordinary medical and dental expenses 
of the children of the parties until said children should die, 
marry or reach the age of majority and finish high school, 
whichever should first occur. 
13. Plaintiff is ordered to procure and maintain health, 
dental, and hospitalization insurance through her place of 
employment for the benefit of the children of the parties until 
said children should die, marry or reach the age of majority and 
finish high school, whichever should first occur. In the event 
that Plaintiff is unable to provide such insurance through her 
workplace, Defendant is ordered to provide insurance if it is 
available to him through his workplace. If neither party has 
insurance available through their employment, they must each pay 
one-half of the premiums necessary to provide health insurance for 
the parties' minor children. 
14. Defendant is ordered to procure and maintain life 
insurance designating Plaintiff as the sole and absolute 
4 
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beneficiary in the amount of $100,000. Said life insurance policy, 
or one for at least as much, to remain in force uwcil the youngest 
child of the parties turns eighteen (18) years of age, and finishes 
high school. 
15. Beginning on October 1, 1993, Plaintiff and Defendant. 
are ordered to share equally the child care expenses necessitated 
by the employment of the custodial parent. Defendant is ordered 
to pay his half of day care costs to Plaintiff on or before the 
first day of each month. 
16. Each party is ordered to pay their individual debts 
subsequent to the date of separation, the 16th day of May, 1991, 
and hold the other harmless therefrom. In addition, Defendant has 
paid the debt on the 318 E Street residence since May of 1991, and 
is fully responsible for any outstanding debts or obligations en 
that property. Defendant is ordered to indemnify and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
17. The debts of the parties are allocated as follows: 
a. Plaintiff is ordered to pay, and hold Defendant 
harmless from the $7,000 Loan owed to Alice Burge. 
b. Effective May 16, 1991, Defendant is ordered to pay, 
and hold Plaintiff harmless from, the following debts: Two 
obligations to the University of Utah Credit Union, 
respectively identified as loans numbered 43966-7-1 and 4o°'o-
7-2; and Mountain America Credit Union. Any past due amounts 
5 
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on these debts are the responsibility of Defendant. 
c. Defendant is ordered to pay any debts not 
specifically mentioned and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
18. Plaintiff is awarded the claim of the Federal and State 
income tax exemptions for the children of the parties. 
19. Plaintiff has not taken Defendant's name during the 
marriage, and has continued to use the surname '"Burge". She is 
permitted to continue to use that name, or, in the event that she 
has ever been known by the name Beverly Facio, she is restored her 
maiden name of Beverly Burge. 
20. Each party is ordered to execute such deeds, contracts, 
agreements or other conveyances as may be necessary to transfer the 
property or things awarded herein to the parties hereto. 
21. The Court should issue an Order to Withhold and Deliver 
consistent with section 62A-11-401 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, pursuant to which the child support awarded 
herein shall be withheld from Defendant's income by his employer, 
and paid over directly to Plaintiff. 
DATED this v i day of '* . • , . ^  * , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
I.CTCOURT.SALTUKEOOUNTY^IAreOT 
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339' 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8920 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio), ; 
Petitioner, ] 
v . • • ] 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, , ] 
Respondent. ] 
) AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Case No. 92.4903403DA 
)• JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
) Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 3 0th day 
of May, 2000. Petitioner, BEVERLY ANN BURGE was present before the Court and was 
represented by her counsel, Connie L. Mower. Respondent, GARY THOMAS FACIO was present 
before the Court and was represented by his counsel, David Larsen. Both parties were sworn in and 
testified, and various pieces of documentary evidence were admitted into evidence. The Court 
having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the evidence in this matter 
thereafter made the following Findings of Fact: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were each residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah" 
three (3) months before the filing of this Amended Complaint for Divorce. 4^; 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were wife and husband having been married on March 
16, 1974 in Wellington, Ohio. -
3. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences developed between 
the parties making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. Two (2) children were born as issue of the marriage, to wit: ASHLEY ALISON 
BURGE FACIO, born March 31,1980, now twenty (20) years of age and PAUL MARLIN BURGE 
FACIO, born April 20,1987, now thirteen (13) years of age. The children have resided continuously 
with Petitioner throughout their minority and the youngest remains in her physical custody as of the 
date of the trial. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded custody of the remaining minor 
child, subject to Respondent's right of reasonable visitation. 
5. Prior to her marriage to Respondent, Petitioner obtained her Bachelor's Degree in 
journalism in Ohio. Within several days of their marriage, Petitioner and Respondent moved to the 
State of Utah, because Respondent had been accepted at the University of Utah to complete his 
Bachelor's Degree. 
6. Both parties were substantially employed throughout the marriage. When 
Petitioner first arrived in Utah, she took a variety of temporary jobs to assist in supporting the family. 
She was later employed by the University of Utah to write a medical history book. Then Petitioner 
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accepted employment as a communications director for the United Way. Following that 
employment, Petitioner was employed in the communications department at Questar, formerly 
known as Mountain Fuel. In 1982, Petitioner accepted employment at the U.S. Postal Service and 
continues to work for the U.S. Postal Service today. Petitioner has worked in a variety of capacities 
for the U.S. Postal Service but in the most recent years has been working in middle management. 
At the time of the trial, Petitioner earned the sum of $5,000.00 per month from her employment with 
the U.S. Postal Service. 
7. Following his move to Utah, Respondent had multiple careers and job 
opportunities. He delivered blood on an emergency basis for the Red Cross. He was employed for 
a period of time by Salt Lake County as a real estate appraiser. Respondent thereafter changed 
careers and began working as a camera operator for Channel 2, KUTV. After a period of time, 
Respondent switched employers and commenced working for Channel 5, KSL TV. Originally he 
was employed as a camera operator, but ultimately worked his way up to the position of director. 
In approximately 1982, Respondent quit his job at KSL TV and took employment at a TV station 
in Phoenix as a director. After approximately one year, Respondent returned into the Salt Lake City 
area and resumed working for KSL TV as a camera operator. Respondent then terminated his 
employment with KSL and worked as a freelance camera operator. Thereafter, Respondent sold real 
estate and for a time, collected unemployment As his real estate career was unsuccessful, Respondent 
accepted employment at Continental Airlines in 1996, working in the reservation department. 
Respondent is presently employed by Continental Airlines and earns the sum of $2,978.00 per 
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month. 
8. Respondent completed his Bachelor's Degree at the University of Utah after approximately 
sixteen (16) years study. Respondent further completed an independent film school and then 
completed a course of study to qualify as a real estate agent. '^v 
9. Although both parties are currently employed on a full-time basis, Respondent is 
not working or earning at his highest potential. Respondent has had multiple career changes during 
the course of his marriage, which were precipitated primarily by his dissatisfaction with his 
employers and the] obs themselves. Respondent has multiple talents which could be used to improve 
his employability: he is educated, he is intelligent, he is creative, he has particular skills in dealing 
with people and he has multiple interests. Respondent, however, shows little follow through in his 
plans and ideas and is now employed at a level less than his abilities would allow. Respondent is 
underemployed. 
10. Petitioner retained an attorney on three separate occasions to obtain a divorce from 
Respondent. The first time was in 1982, the second in 1991, and the third in 1997. In approximately 
1981, the Petitioner and Respondent separated, and in 1982 the Respondent accepted employment 
in Arizona. Prior to the parties' separation, Petitioner believed that Respondent was financially 
irresponsible and creating unnecessary debt for the family. The Respondent had moved out of state, 
and had little contact with the Petitioner or their infant daughter. The Petitioner filed for divorce in 
1982. However, after Respondent began contacting the Petitioner, the Petitioner ultimately 
dismissed that action. The parties reconciled, and in approximately 1983, the respondent moved 
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back to the state of Utah and commenced residing with the Petitioner. 
12. The parties separated again in 1991. Petitioner commenced the new divorce action 
because she discovered that Respondent had surreptitiously cashed in various IRAs funded by 
Petitioner and from gifts from her family. Petitioner further discovered that Respondent had secretly 
liquidated the college fund established by Petitioner for the parties' oldest child. Respondent had 
secretly incurred numerous debts for his own personal use and not the family. Respondent had failed 
and refused to file his federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner was concerned that 
Respondent's spendthrift habits and inability to control his indebtedness would result in financial 
ruin for herself and the children. Petitioner was further concerned about the Respondent's failure 
to file the federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner worried that the family's financial 
condition could be jeopardized by unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. 
13. More importantly however, Petitioner was concerned with the dishonesty that 
surrounded Respondent and all his financial dealings. Respondent lied about his spending and his 
dissipation of assets. He failed to come forward with the truth until directly confronted by 
Petitioner. Although Respondent pledged to correct his behavior, he never did. Petitioner instructed 
her counsel, Louise Knauer, to prepare a Complaint for Divorce. Petitioner's counsel, in fact, 
prepared such a Complaint. A copy of the Complaint was delivered to Respondent. Respondent did 
not want to be divorced. Respondent pleaded with Petitioner to seek some other solution to their 
financial instabilities other than divorce. Respondent wanted the marriage to continue, and 
ultimately, Petitioner was convinced by Respondent that she should seek an Order for Separate 
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Maintenance. An Order of Separate Maintenance; Respondent told Petitioner, would separate the 
parties' assets and debts and would protect her financially from his debts and obligations while 
preserving the marriage between the parties. Petitioner instructed her counsel to amend the 
complaint from divorce to separate maintenance. That action was filed on the 11th day of August, 
1992. Respondent thereafter executed an Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which he agreed that 
the Court could enter an Order consistent with Petitioner's Complaint for Separate of Maintenance. 
On or about August 28, 1992, an Order for Separate Maintenance was signed and entered by the 
Court. 
14. Petitioner testified that prior to executing the Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, 
Respondent acknowledged to her that he Had consulted with his attorney Brian Barnard, who 
suggested changes to the terms of the Complaint to bring the terms in compliance with recent 
changes in the law. As further evidence of Respondent's consultation with Mr. Barnard on the 
Divorce and then the Separate Maintenance action, Petitioner testified that Respondent told her that 
Mr. Barnard could not give her advice on a separate legal matter due to the pending action between 
the parties. On the stand, Respondent denied speaking to his attorney about the Order of Separate 
Maintenance. However, documentary evidence established that Respondent consulted at this time 
with Mr. Barnard about a divorce. Additionally, Respondent acknowledged that Brian Barnard had 
represented him in certain proceedings in the 1980's and further that Mr. Barnard represented him 
in this action commencing in 1998. The Court credited Petitioner's testimony and found it 
persuasive. Even if he had not, Respondent was intelligent enough and informed enough to know 
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that he could seek legal counsel prior to agreeing to the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
15. In the Order of Separate Maintenance, the Court ordered among other things: 
A. Petitioner and Respondent were awarded the joint legal custody of the 
parties' minor children. Petitioner was awarded sole physical custody, 
subject to the Respondent's right of liberal and reasonable visitation. 
B. Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per 
month until September 1992. From September 1992, through September of 
1993, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $500.00 per month as and 
for child support. This included his contribution for day care. Petitioner and 
Respondent were ordered to exchange income tax returns and income 
documentation beginning in 1993 and to recalculate in 1993, child support 
based upon the parties' incomes. 
C. Petitioner was ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children. Petitioner was further ordered to pay all 
routine medical expenses incurred for the children. However, each party was 
ordered to pay one-half (V2) of any payment of extraordinary medical and 
dental expenses for the minor children. 
D. Beginning October 1, 1993, Respondent was ordered to equally share in the 
child care expenses incurred by Petitioner related to her employment on or 
before the first day of each month. 
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E. The Court divided the debts between the parties, assigning to Petitioner an 
equitable share of the marital debts and to Respondent, his separate personal 
debts. 1 
F. Petitioner was awarded all right, title and interest in the residence, located at 
2869 Live Oak Circle, titled exclusively in her name because non-marital 
assets and a loan from Petitioner's mother were used to acquire the home. 
G. Prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, the parties sold the 
marital residence located at 318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties 
divided the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence in a fair and 
equitable manner and the Court approved the division. 
H. The Court divided the parties' motor vehicles and entered orders with respect 
to any debts owing thereon. 
L Petitioner was awarded all stocks or other securities in her name. Respondent 
was awarded the stock in his name. 
•L. Petitioner was awarded all IRA's accounts and savings bonds in her name 
and the IRA account which was held jointly between the parties. 
K. Each party was awarded the retirement accounts in his or her own names. 
L. Neither party was awarded alimony from the other. 
M. Various other orders were entered in the Order for Separate Maintenance 
which are not particularly significant to the actions therein. 
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16. At the time of the parties' separation in 1991, each of the parties had acquired marital 
and personal assets. Such assets include the following: 
A. In 1976, the parties acquired a marital residence and real property located at 
318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The family lived in this residence until 
approximately October, 1989, when Petitioner purchased the home on Live 
Oak Circle from separate funds. The parties moved into the Live Oak home. 
The parties attempted to lease the E Street home and were successful in doing 
so for a period of time. However, because they were unable to find reliable 
long-term tenants, the E Street home was vacant. When the parties separated 
f in 1991, Respondent moved from Petitioner's residence on Live Oak Circle 
to the marital residence located on E Street. Even though Respondent was 
employed and had earnings with which to meet his own expenses after 
separation, Respondent failed to make the mortgage payments on the E Street 
residence where he was residing. In order to protect her credit, Petitioner was 
forced not only to pay the mortgage on her residence on Live Oak Circle, but 
likewise was forced to pay the mortgage obligation on the E Street residence 
during Respondent's tenancy. After many months of paying both mortgage 
obligations, Petitioner insisted that the E Street home be sold. Respondent 
ultimately agreed. Petitioner executed a Quit Claim Deed to the residence to 
Respondent and Respondent thereafter sold that property. From the sale of 
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the E Street home, Respondent, who acted as his own real estate agent, 
received gross proceeds in the amount of $48,000.00. Petitioner and 
Respondent agreed that Respondent could retain all proceeds from the sale, 
however Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner back for all the assets depleted 
by him without her knowledge or consent while they were living together. 
To satisfy this obligation, Respondent paid Petitioner the sum of $25,000.00. 
Respondent kept the remaining proceeds. He spent the proceeds on a lap top, 
car phone, clothing for himself, used some for living expenses and paid for 
business expenses including a school for cash flow management in San 
Diego, California for commercial real estate, The parties further agreed that 
because the Live Oak Circle was titled exclusively in Petitioner's name and 
because Petitioner had acquired this home using separate funds in the form 
of gifts from her mother and a loan from her mother, that it was fair and 
reasonable that Petitioner be awarded all right, title and interest in Live Oak 
Circle. 
B. During the course of the marriage, the parties each acquired retirement 
benefits through employment. Petitioner had acquired employment benefits 
through the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired retirement benefits 
through his employment at KSL TV. The parties agreed that each would be 
awarded her or Ms own retirement benefits, subject to no claim in the other. 
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C Routinely during the course of the marriage, Petitioner received various gifts 
and advances on her inheritance from her mother. She also received an 
inheritance from her uncle in 1993 or 1994. When she received such gifts 
and monies, Petitioner placed these funds into separate accounts titled in her 
name alone (in the form of savings accounts, CD's, IRA's, mutual funds, 
stocks and bonds.) These funds were never co-mingled with Respondent's 
property after the separation in 1991. The parties thereafter agreed that it was 
fair and reasonable that Petitioner retain as her separate property those 
accounts acquired primarily from these gifts and/or advances on her 
inheritance subject td no claim in Respondent. 
D. Early in the marriage, Respondent assisted in meeting the family's financial 
needs and obligations. After 1989, Petitioner alone was forced to assume 
and discharge all of the marital indebtedness that had jointly acquired by the 
parties for the benefit of the family. Respondent paid none of these debts. 
At the time of the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, most of the 
joint marital indebtedness had been discharged by Petitioner. Petitioner was 
therefore only ordered to pay and hold Respondent harmless on the loan from 
her mother used as a partial down payment on the Live Oak home. 
Respondent had acquired various non marital debts, including obligations on 
two credit cards. These debts were not for a family purpose and were 
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exclusively incurred by Respondent for his own benefit. Respondent agreed 
to pay and hold Petitioner harmless from those debts. ^ 
17. From 1991, until approximately end of 1993 or early 1994, the parties continued 
to live separate and apart. Respondent repeatedly represented to Petitioner that he was working very 
diligently to resolve his financial insolvency. Respondent repeatedly agreed or represented to 
Petitioner that he had filed or was preparing to file the state and federal returns for all years in which 
he had not. Respondent further continued to promise Petitioner that they would be able to reconcile 
at some point in the future because of the improvements that he had made in his life. Petitioner and 
Respondent again commenced with marital counseling trying resolve their differences. Respondent 
also sought individual counseling. On or about March 31,1993, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter 
in which he again represented that he was "going to work on changing patterns in my personal 
behavior that has been so damaging to our relationship". Respondent promised Petitioner that he 
would talk about problems between the parties and to not avoid them. He promised that he would 
do the things that he said he would do and do them in a timely fashion. He promised to pay his bills 
on time, including his taxes. He promised, further, to remain monogamous. In this letter, 
Respondent invited Petitioner to resume joint counseling to repair the relationship. Respondent 
proposed that the parties' potential reconciliation be a three step process." 1) burying past anger and 
resentment 2) renewing a courtship between us and 3) deciding on a remarriage." In response to 
Respondent's letter, Petitioner agreed to consider actual reconciliation if Respondent in fact followed 
through on his commitment he detailed in the letter. The end of 1993 or early 1994, Petitioner 
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learned that Respondent had lost his housing. Petitioner was concerned that Respondent would not 
be able to find suitable replacement housing. Petitioner agreed to allow Respondent to move back 
into her residence so that he could continue to work on the problems that led to the parties' initial 
separation. Petitioner hoped, for the sake of her children, Respondent would be able to meet all the 
commitments set forth in his letter of March 31, 1993. Both parties understood that just because 
Petitioner allowed Respondent to move into her residence, that such did not mean the parties had 
reconciled. According to the parties agreement actual reconciliation would be accomplished by a 
remarriage. With that understanding, Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. 
18. While Respondent lived with Petitioner, he continued to work in his various 
occupations. Respondent was not a house husband. There was not a gender role reversal between 
the parties wherein Petitioner was the bread winner and Respondent was responsible for the home 
and children. Petitioner continued to be primarily responsible to attend to the children and all of 
their needs. Petitioner cleaned the house, did the yard work, did the laundry, grocery shopping and 
otherwise managed the household. Respondent did do small services for Petitioner. He painted a 
wall in the basement. He clipped and shredded refuse from the lawn on one occasion. He planted 
acorns to raise scrub oak trees. Respondent did do some chores around the house. Respondent did 
attend to some of the children's needs when he was not working. However, Petitioner could not trust 
Respondent to follow through with serious responsibilities and therefore did those herself. For 
example, Respondent wanted to be responsible to take the parties son Paul to school. In 24 days, 
Paul had 12 tardies. Petitioner resumed delivering the child to school herself. 
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19. In spite of the fact that Petitioner and Respondent resided under the same roof, the 
parties still lived under the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance; in that the parties' financial 
matters continued to be held separate from the other. Following the parties' separation in 1991, 
Petitioner had closed the parties' joint account and established her own separate checking account. 
Petitioner maintained the investments awarded to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance in 
separate accounts. All of the household obligations were in Petitioner's name; Respondent assumed 
no liability for these. Petitioner and the children lived a modest lifestyle. However, Petitioner set 
aside further savings for the children's college and for her retirement in separate accounts. Petitioner 
continued to pay for her home. The Petitioner filed separate tax returns yearly as head of household, 
with the Respondent's Jknowledge. When Respondent moved into the residence, there was no 
formal agreement as to how much he would contribute to the household to offset the additional 
expenses for his residence in that home. Instead, Petitioner and Respondent agreed that he would 
pay $500.00 per month for child support as though the parties were living separately. Petitioner paid 
all of her liabilities for herself and the children and paid all bills with connection with the household 
20. Petitioner would not have allowed Respondent to live in her home without the 
protection of the Order of Separate Maintenance insulating her income and assets from Respondent's 
irresponsible financial behavior. Petitioner testified that on at least on a half dozen occasions, the 
parties specifically discussed the fact that the Order of Separate Maintenance was still in place, 
completely separating the parties assets and liabilities. Respondent told Petitioner, "The Order of 
Separate Maintenance is there for your and the children's protection". "I want you to feel 
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comfortable about money issues". Respondent never asked the Court to set aside the order because 
he knew his financial problems were not resolved and the Petitioner never asked that the order be 
lifted. Both parties relied on and implemented the provisions of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
For example, on one occasion, Petitioner attempted to obtain a home equity loan. When the 
mortgage company obtained a credit report on Petitioner, a bill owing to Sears incurred separately 
by Respondent appeared on her report. Respondent asked Sears to delete the credit report on this 
account, because he and Petitioner were living under an "Order of Separate Maintenance" and 
therefore, Petitioner could not be held liable for his debts. Because of the Order of Separate 
Maintenance, Sears deleted the negative credit report on Petitioner's credit for the obligation owing 
to them. Petitioner was then able to obtain a home equity loan in her own name. 
21. Even though Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $500.00 per month child support while 
he resided in her home from 1994 through September of 1997, Respondent only contributed 
$5,600.00 to the children's support during that time period. Respondent made no other financial 
contribution to the household. In fact, documentary evidence was admitted which substantiated the 
fact that Respondent himself did not believe he had an ongoing financial obligation to Petitioner's 
household and the children. In his Consumer Credit Counseling application, he did not list the 
Petitioner as his spouse. He did not list any family bills, any payments toward a rent or mortgage 
or even information regarding his obligation to his children. 
22. Even though he had promised Petitioner that he would become financially solvent after 
he moved in with her, Respondent continued to incur unnecessary indebtedness. Respondent failed 
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to pay his personal monthly obligations on a timely basis and debt collection summonses and 
subpoenas were delivered to the Respondent at the Live Oak address. Respondent's financial 
condition was so poor that he sought the assistance of Consumer Credit Counseling to help him meet 
his monthly obligations to his own personal creditors. Before his debts were paid off, Respondent 
terminated his relationship with Consumer Credit Counseling. Respondent continued to avoid filing 
of his tax returns. Respondent lead Petitioner to believe he had appointments with his accountant, 
that he was gathering the financial information, that the returns were going to be filed. To the best 
of Petitioner's information, Respondent had not filed taxes from 1990 to the present. Respondent 
borrowed money from Petitioner for his own needs. Each time, he promised he would pay her back. 
Respondent never did. Respondent acknowledged under oath that he never met the conditions 
agreed to for permanent reconciliation. In fact Respondent testified that doing so was still a "work 
in progress". Respondent liquidated his KSL retirement in 1993/1994 and dissipated the proceeds. 
Respondent acquired nothing from his income in terms of assets or cash to show from his 
employment. Respondent was not monogamous. He continued to date and have girlfriends while 
he lived with the Petitioner. 
23. Because of his failure to correct his behavior, Petitioner asked Respondent to 
move out. Respondent told Petitioner he did not have any money to move out. Petitioner loaned 
Respondent $1,800.00 to assist him in securing an apartment and another $3,000.00 to purchase a 
car for transportation. Petitioner believed that this was the last time she would have to pay 
Respondent money. Based upon Respondent's history of financial failure and irresponsibility, 
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Petitioner did not expect repayment of the loan. 
24. Petitioner filed again for divorce on October 7, 1997. Various orders were 
entered on a temporary basis. 
25. On or about March 19,1999, this Court entered its Bifurcated Decree of Divorce granting 
Petitioner a divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The financial issues raised in 
this matter were bifurcated for further hearing before the Court. 
26. Trial was held on May 30, 2000. The Court issued its ruling in open Court. Further 
proceedings were held on August 4, 2000, to clarify the Courts ruling. At the time of trial, 
Respondent did not dispute custody, child support, medical insurance, debt division, attorney's fees, 
distribution of Petitioner's IRA's, stocks, bonds or other investments outlined in her financial 
declaration. Respondent only contested the equity acquired in Petitioner's residence and division 
of Petitioner's retirement accounts with the US Postal Service. 
27. After trial, the Court made the following orders: 
A. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the remaining minor child subject to Respondent's right of reasonable 
visitation as the parties may agree but at a minimum, consistent with Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-35. 
B. Effective June 1, 2000, Respondent was ordered to pay to Petitioner child 
support in the sum of $270.84 per month which is consistent with the Utah Child 
Support Guidelines, using gross income from Petitioner of $5,000.00 and gross 
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income of Respondent of $2978.00. Respondent's child support obligation is 
payable one-half on the 5th and the remaining one-half on the 20th of each calendar 
month. Respondent's obligation should be ordered to continue until the minor child 
reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. 
C. Petitioner should be ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the 
benefit of the child. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half of the child's per 
capita share of the entire premium. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-hatf 
of the non-covered medical bills incurred by the Petitioner for the child. Petitioner 
should be ordered to provide proof at the end of each calendar month that she 
incurred a non-covered cost by providing a copy of her insurance explanation of 
benefits form. Respondent should be ordered to pay his one-half share within 30 
days of receipt. 
D. Due to the age of the remaining child, no further daycare will be incurred. 
E. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner incurred various 
debts and obligations which are detailed on her Financial Declaration which is filed with this Court. 
Because these debts were incurred by Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, 
they are separate debts. Petitioner should assume and discharge these debts and hold Respondent 
harmless therefrom. 
F. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent incurred various 
debts and obligations detailed on his Financial Declaration which is on file with this Court. Because 
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Respondent incurred this indebtedness after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, these 
debts are separate. Respondent shall assume and discharge these debts and hold the Petitioner 
harmless therefrom. 
28. Petitioner has acquired an interest in various IRA's, Stocks, bonds, and other investments. 
Petitioner shall be awarded all right, title and interest in the American Century IRA, the Smith-
Barney IRA, the Key Bank IRA, the Charles Schwab IRA, the Co Bank Investment, Mass Investors 
Gross Stock Fund A, AL Tel, RPM, Alliance Inc. Fund, National Auto Credit Inc., Transonic 
Company, Traveler's, CSX, American General Corp, Vanguard 500 Index Fund, American Century 
Ultra, Questar and Novell. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in these investments 
because they were principally gifted to her or acquired prior to entry of the Order of Separate 
Maintenance and because any contribution made thereafter, was made from Petitioner's separate 
funds. 
29. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in the residence located at 2963 Live Oak 
Circle. Petitioner shall discharge the indebtedness on this residence and shall hold Respondent 
harmless therefrom. The Court awards this property to Petitioner because it awarded this property 
to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance entered in 1992 and because any contribution to the 
equity since that time has been made from Petitioner's separate funds. 
30. Petitioner has continued to acquire an interest in various pension and retirement through 
her employment through the U.S. Postal Service. Petitioner was previously awarded those benefits 
which were accumulated prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance in 1992. Petitioner 
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is further awarded all right, title and interest in these accounts, which were accumulated after the 
entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Petitioner is awarded this as her separate property 
because she obtained these additional benefits through her separate funds. 
31. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent acquired an interest 
in certain pension and retirement benefits through his employment at Continental Airlines. 
Respondent is awarded this property as his sole, and separate property, having been acquired from 
his separate funds. 
32. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner acquired an interest in 
a savings and a checking account. Because those accounts were funded with separate funds from 
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner is awarded all right/title 
and interest in those accounts. 
33. Petitioner sought judgment against Respondent for all unpaid child support due to her 
after Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. The Court denies that Petitioner's request for 
judgment, finding that although Respondent only paid $5,600.00 of what would have exceeded 
$35,000.00 in child support obligation, the Court will not grant child support if the parties were 
residing under the same roof. However, Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner all unpaid child 
support from 1992 until he moved into Petitioner's house. Therefore, judgment of $11,500.00 
should enter against Respondent. 
34. Petitioner and Respondent were each ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its Conclusions of Law: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter herein. 
2. Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
between Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
become final upon signing and entry. 
3. Respondent did not contest the orders set forth in paragraphs 4-13 below, therefore, the 
Court concludes that such orders are fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
4. Petitioner shall be awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child 
to wit: PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of 
Visitation contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines 
to Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37. 
5. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is 
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $226.00 per month, which sum is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support 
obligations should be payable one-half (Vz) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half 
QA) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue 
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever 
occurs later. 
6. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred 
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Therefore, no ongoing order needs to be entered. 
7. Respondent's obligation to pay child support should be paid through Automatic Wage 
Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative fee 
imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding shall be collected from Respondent in addition 
to his base child support obligations. 
8. Effective June 1, 2000, Petitioner shall continue to be ordered to maintain a policy of 
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through 
her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent 
should each be ordered to pay one-half (l/2) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and 
dental insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half QA) share is $16.45. Petitioner and 
Respondent shall each be ordered to assume and pay one-half (/4) of all non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of 
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the 
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner shall be ordered to 
provide written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical 
and dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent should be ordered to pay 
his one-half QA) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of 
such documentation. 
9. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance 
policy on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor 
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child as the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent should each 
be enjoined and restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value 
of such life insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates 
from high school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and 
beneficiary status on or about January 15th of each calendar year. 
10. Petitioner shall be awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for 
purposes of filing of federal and state income tax returns. 
11. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis. 
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent should be awarded 
alimony either now or in the future. • 
12. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property now in his or her 
possession. Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal 
property if he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing. 
13. Each party should be awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name. 
14. The Respondent contested at trial the legal effect of the Order of Separate Maintenance 
entered on or about August 28, 1992. 
15. In 1992 , Respondent was given a copy of the complaint for Separate Maintenance. 
Respondent did not contest the relief requested. Respondent voluntarily executed an Acceptance, 
Waiver and Consent, which gave the Court the authority to enter its orders consistent with the 
Complaint 
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16. Respondent consulted with his attorney, Brian Barnard, regarding the proposed terms 
of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Respondent's execution of the Appearance, Waiver and 
Consent was knowing. **'*• 
17. The Order of Separate Maintenance was the product of arms length negotiations between 
the parties. * ' 
18. Respondent is an intelligent, well-educated man, who is able to read and understand the 
English language and could understand the terms of the Complaint for Separate Maintenance. 
19. No duress, coercion or trickery was employed to induce the Respondent to agree to the 
terms of the Separate Maintenance. 
20. The Order of Separate Maintenance, which distributed the parties' assets and allocated 
debts,, among other things, appears to be a fair, equitable and permanent settlement of the parties' 
respective rights and obligations as they existed in 1991 and therefore, the order is res judicata as to 
the property settlement and other issues addressed in the order because it was a valid order. The 
Court will not redistribute property awarded under that order. Each of the parties received an 
equitable portion of the equity in the marital residence jointly acquired through the marriage. The, 
proceeds from the home on E Street were awarded to Respondent, provided that he paid to Petitioner 
the sum of $25,000.00 to restore certain funds which the Respondent had dissipated during the 
marriage. Respondent therefore received all of the equity in that residence. He cannot claim the 
order was unfair to him. He later spent these funds on personal items and not family expenses. 
Petitioner was awarded as her separate property the home located on Live Oak Circle. This home 
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was primarily acquired with separate funds, those being gifts and loans from Petitioner's family. 
Respondent made little or no contribution to this home and therefore, cannot claim the order was 
unfair to him. The Court entered its Order awarding each of the parties those retirement and pension 
benefits that she and he had individually acquired throughout the marriage. Petitioner had acquired 
benefits through her employment with the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired benefits 
through his employment and KSL TV. The division of retirement was not unfair to Respondent. The 
Court further awarded each party his or her separate property, received through gift or inheritance, 
which was un-commingled with the marital estate. 
21. The Order of Separate Maintenance further divided the existing debts between the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner. Petitioner was ordered to pay certain outstanding debts of the 
marriage. Respondent was ordered to pay only his personal liabilities. The order is not unfair to 
Respondent. 
22. All remaining orders in the Order of Separate Maintenance appear to be fair and 
reasonable and consistent with the law. 
23. Once the Order for Separate Maintenance was entered, the parties financial affairs were 
completely separated. Even though, Petitioner in 1993 or 1994, allowed Respondent to live under 
her roof, the parties did not intend to dissolve the protections given under the Order of Separate 
Maintenance. Both parties relied upon its provisions in conducting their financial affairs. The Court 
was never asked by either party to change the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Neither 
party petitioned the Court to terminate the obligations under the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
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Upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation, the Court could have modified 
or terminated the existing Order. However, under the evidence of this case, the Court finds, that the 
"reconciliation" was not permanent not complete as required. It was tentative, provisional and 
conditional based upon Respondent's promised performance to certain agreed conditions. Because 
Respondent did not meet the stated conditions, no voluntary or permanent reconciliation took place. 
24. From 1992 through 1997, the parties5 had separate finances. The parties maintained no 
joint accounts. The parties did not maintain co-ownership of property or maintained joint 
obligations. Respondent did not acquire a further marital interest in Petitioner's property 
25. From 1992 to 1997, Petitioner met all of the needs of the household, including the minor 
children, from her separate income. Except that Respondent paid $5,600.00 as and for child support 
during that period of time. Petitioner retained these funds but the Court will not grant Petitioner 
further judgment for unpaid support during the time Respondent lived in the same house as the 
children. Judgment should enter against Respondent for unpaid support from May 1991 to 
December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves ruling on any other arrearage. 
26. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the 
Petitioner in the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
27. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in retirement funds acquired by 
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
28. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while 
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle should be denied. 
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29. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to assume and pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
30. Each party should be ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this Ifl day of UUO^ ]) 2001. 
HONORABLE WILLI 
District Court Judge 
RM^ W$\ 
NOTICE 
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10) 
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as 
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court. 
DATED this 2(t ;day of y u i ^ \ 2001. 
IE L. MOWER 
ttorney for Petitioner 
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8920 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio), ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, * ] 
Respondent. ] 
) AMENDED DECREE OF 
) DIVORCE 
) Case No. 924903403DA 
) JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
i Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 3 0th day 
of May, 2000. The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the 
evidence in this matter and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for good 
cause appearing, now therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between 
Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final 
upon signing and entry. 
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2. Petitioner is awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child to wit: 
PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, bom April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded reasonable 
rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of Visitation 
contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines to 
Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37. - ^ 
3. Effective June 1, 2000, the parlies' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is 
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $226.00 per month, which sum is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support 
obligations should be payable one-half (Vi) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half 
(Yz) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue 
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever 
occurs later. 
4. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred Therefore, 
no ongoing order is entered. 
5. Respondent's obligation to pay child support is ordered to be paid through Automatic 
Wage Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. sea. Any administrative 
fee imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding are to be collected from Respondent in 
addition to his base child support obligations. 
6. Effective June 1,2000, Petitioner is ordered to continue to be ordered to maintain a policy 
of medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through 
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her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent 
are each ordered to pay one-half (14) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and dental 
insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half (14) share is $16.45. Petitioner and 
Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay one-half (14) of all non-covered medical and dental 
expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of 
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the 
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner is ordered to provide 
written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent is ordered to pay his one-half 
(14) share' of the non-medical, and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of such 
documentation. 
7. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance policy 
on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor child as 
the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent are each enjoined and 
restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value of such life 
insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high 
school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and beneficiary 
status on or about January 15th of each calendar year. 
8. Petitioner is awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for purposes 
of filing of federal and state income tax returns. 
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9. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a foil time basis. 
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent are awarded alimony 
either now or in the future. 
10. Each party is awarded those items of personal property now in his or her possession. 
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal property if 
he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing. 
11. Each party is awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name. 
12. The Court will not grant Petitioner further judgment for unpaid support during the time 
Respondent lived in the same house as the children. Judgment will enter against Respondent for 
unpaid support from May 1991 to December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves* 
ruling on any other arrearage. 
13. Respondent is not awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the Petitioner 
in the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
14. Respondent is not awarded any farther interest in retirement funds acquired by Petitioner 
after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
15. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while 
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle is denied 
16. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
17. Each party is ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the 
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Amended Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this ( ^ day of ,2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B.'^OHUING 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE 
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10) 
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as 
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court. 
DATED this *) Q d^ay of 2001. 
L. MOWER 
ttorney for Petitioner 
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SNOW NUFFER 
A Professional Corporation 
341 South Main Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 538-0400 
Facsimile (801) 538-0423 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OBJECTION TO AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924903403DA 
Judge BOHLING 
Commissioner EVANS 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, through counsel, and objects to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Petitioner. The 
objection is based on the following. 
1. Petitioner's counsel took 11 months to prepare the findings. 
2. The Petitioner submitted the findings without providing the 
Respondent an opportunity to review them in violation of Rule 4-501 of the 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, 
Respondent. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration. A Notice to Submit was included with 
the filing. 
3. The Respondent objects to nearly every paragraph of the 28 page 
document. The document does not represent the testimony, evidence 
presented or findings of fact that were made at the trial. 
4. Respondent requests a hearing in this matter. 
DATED THIS ^ 1 day o R " i f T L ^ C . 2001 
SNOW NUFFER 
A Professional Corporation 
David P. Larson 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the^pJ^p day of X-LyA1-^ 2001, I served a 
copy of the foregoing on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Connie Mower Esq. 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Third District Court Clerk 
450 S. State 
P.O. Box 1860 
5alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary 
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BEV, 
I KNOW THAT WHEN I WALKED OUT OF THE SESSION WITH YOU AND STEVE ON 
MARCH 4TH, IT WAS THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK. I'M 
SORRY. I JUST PANICKED. I HAD COME INTO COUNSELING AND BACK INTO 
THE RELATIONSHIP WITH A LOT OF HOPE AND WAS ALREADY VERY 
EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED. THE THOUGHT OF US BEING THAT CLOSE TO 
FAILURE/EVOKED A VERY IMPULSIVE AND REGRETTABLE RESPONSE. 
I'M ASKING YOU TO JOIN ME IN COUNSELING AGAIN WITH STEVE, I KNOW 
IT WILL HELP US. 
I AM GOING TO WORK ON CHANGING PATTERNS IN MY PERSONAL BEHAVIOR 
THAT HAVE BEEN SO DAMAGING TO OUR RELATIONSHIP. _ . 
(l WILL TALK ABOUT PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE, NOT AVOID THEM.-^ ^ ' l£ Lf*. J 
7 } I WILL DO THE THINGS I SAY I WILL DO AND I WILL DO THEM ON TIMEiH 
'^1 / 
I I WILL PAY MY BILLS ON TIME, INCLUDING MY TAXES. v ^  . 
\I WILL REMAIN MONOGAMOUS AND WILL NOT DATE. if &4-f -^^ _ 
I WILL WORK WITH YOU ON A SATISFACTORY FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT « 
INCLUDING A JOIN ACCOUNT AND A COMPLETE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL THE 
MONEY THAT I MAKE. I WOULD LIKE UNTIL AUGUST 31,1993 BEFORE WE 
START THE JOINT ACCOUNT, SO THAT I CAN PAY OFF ALL OF MY BILLS. 
I WOULD LIKE US TO NEGOTIATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WORK AROUND THE 
HOUSE AND CHILD CARE. WE SHOULD PROBABLY DO THAT IN SESSION WITH 
STEVE. 
IF YOU GO INTO COUNSELING WITH ME - STEVE SAYS IT WILL BE A THREE 
STEP PROCESS. 
1) BURYING PAST ANGER AND RESENTMENT. 
2) RENEWING A COURTSHIP BETWEEN US. 
3) DECIDING ON REMARRIAGE. 
•i-**"^ ^ u V —9'// lu^-u-triUc ~k< «../ u4i# ****( l^ptn^H 
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8920 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio), ; 
Petitioner, ) 
v. ) 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, •] 
Respondent. ) 
) SECOND AMENDED 
> FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i CaseNo.924903403DA 
I JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
i Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 30 day 
of May, 2000. Petitioner, BEVERLY ANN BURGE was present before the Court and was 
represented by her counsel, Connie L. Mower. Respondent, GARY THOMAS FACIO was present 
before the Court and was represented by his counsel, David Larsen. Both parties were sworn in and 
testified, and various pieces of documentary evidence were admitted into evidence. The Court 
having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the evidence in this matter 
thereafter made the following Findings of Fact: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were each residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
three (3) months before the filing of this Amended Complaint for Divorce. *~' 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were wife and husband having been married on March * 
16, 1974 in Wellington, Ohio. 
3. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences developed between 
the parties making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. Two (2) children were born as issue of the marriage, to wit: ASHLEY ALISON 
BURGE FACIO, born March 31,1980, now twenty (20) years of age and PAUL MARLIN BURGE 
FACIO, born April 20,1987, now thirteen (13) years of age. The children have resided continuously 
with Petitioner throughout their minority and the youngest remains in her physical custody as of the 
date of the trial. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded custody of the remaining minor 
child, subject to Respondent's right of reasonable visitation. 
5. Prior to her marriage to Respondent, Petitioner obtained her Bachelor's Degree in 
journalism in Ohio. Within several days of their marriage, Petitioner and Respondent moved to the 
State of Utah, because Respondent had been accepted at the University of Utah to complete his 
Bachelor's Degree. 
6. Both parties were substantially employed throughout the marriage. When 
Petitioner first arrived in Utah, she took a variety of temporary jobs to assist in supporting the family. 
She was later employed by the University of Utah to write a medical history book. Then Petitioner 
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accepted employment as a communications director for the United Way. Following that 
employment, Petitioner was employed in the communications department at Questar, formerly 
known as Mountain Fuel. In 1982, Petitioner accepted employment at the U.S. Postal Service and 
continues to work for the U.S. Postal Service today. Petitioner has worked in a variety of capacities 
for the U.S. Postal Service but in the most recent years has been working in middle management. 
At the time of the trial, Petitioner earned the sum of $5,000.00 per month from her employment with 
the U.S. Postal Service. 
7. Following his move to Utah, Respondent had multiple careers and job 
opportunities. He delivered blood on an emergency basis for the Red Cross. He was employed for 
a period of time by Salt Lake County as a real estate appraiser. Respondent thereafter changed 
careers and began working as a camera operator for Channel 2, KUTV. After a period of time, 
Respondent switched employers and commenced working for Channel 5, KSL TV. Originally he 
was employed as a camera operator, but ultimately worked his way up to the position of director. 
In approximately 1982, Respondent quit his job at KSL TV and took employment at a TV station 
in Phoenix as a director. After approximately one year, Respondent returned into the Salt Lake City 
area and resumed working for KSL TV as a camera operator. Respondent then terminated his 
employment with KSL and worked as a freelance camera operator. Thereafter, Respondent sold real 
estate and for a time, collected unemployment As his real estate career was unsuccessful, Respondent 
accepted employment at Continental Airlines in 1996, working in the reservation department. 
Respondent is presently employed by Continental Airlines and earns the sum of $3,500.00 per 
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month. 
8. Respondent completed his Bachelor's Degree at the University of Utah after approximately 
sixteen (16) years study. Respondent further completed an independent film school and then 
completed a course of study to qualify as a real estate agent. - ^ 
9. Although both parties are currently employed on a full-time basis, Respondent is ' 
not working or earning at his highest potential. Respondent has had multiple career changes during 
the course of his marriage, which were precipitated primarily by his dissatisfaction with his 
employers and the jobs themselves. Respondent has multiple talents which could be used to improve 
his employability: he is educated, he is intelligent, he is creative, he has particular skills in dealing 
with people and he has multiple interests. Respondent, however, shows little follow through in his 
plans and ideas and is now employed at a level less than his abilities would allow. Respondent is 
underemployed. 
10. Petitioner retained an attorney on three separate occasions to obtain a divorce from 
Respondent. The first time was in 1982, the second in 1991, and the third in 1997. In approximately 
1981, the Petitioner and Respondent separated, and in 1982 the Respondent accepted employment 
in Arizona. Prior to the parties' separation, Petitioner believed that Respondent was financially 
irresponsible and creating unnecessary debt for the family. The Respondent had moved out of state, 
and had little contact with the Petitioner or their infant daughter. The Petitioner filed for divorce in 
1982. However, after Respondent began contacting the Petitioner, the Petitioner ultimately 
dismissed that action. The parties reconciled, and in approximately 1983, the respondent moved 
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back to the state of Utah and commenced residing with the Petitioner. 
12. The parties separated again in 1991. Petitioner commenced the new divorce action 
because she discovered that Respondent had surreptitiously cashed in various IRAs funded by 
Petitioner and from gifts from her family. Petitioner further discovered that Respondent had secretly 
liquidated the college fund established by Petitioner for the parties' oldest child. Respondent had 
secretly incurred numerous debts for his own personal use and not the family. Respondent had failed 
and refused to file his federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner was concerned that 
Respondent's spendthrift habits and inability to control his indebtedness would result in financial 
ruin for herself and the children. Petitioner was further concerned about the Respondent's failure 
to file the federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner worried that the family's financial 
condition could be jeopardized by unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. 
13. More importantly however, Petitioner was concerned with the dishonesty that 
surrounded Respondent and all his financial dealings. Respondent lied about his spending and his 
dissipation of assets. He failed to come forward with the truth until directly confronted by 
Petitioner. Although Respondent pledged to correct his behavior, he never did. Petitioner instructed 
her counsel, Louise Knauer, to prepare a Complaint for Divorce. Petitioner's counsel, in fact, 
prepared such a Complaint. A copy of the Complaint was delivered to Respondent. Respondent did 
not want to be divorced. Respondent pleaded with Petitioner to seek some other solution to their 
financial instabilities other than divorce. Respondent wanted the marriage to continue, and 
ultimately, Petitioner was convinced by Respondent that she should seek an Order for Separate 
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Maintenance. An Order of Separate Maintenance; Respondent told Petitioner, would separate the 
parties' assets and debts and would protect her financially from his debts and obligations while 
preserving the marriage between the parties. Petitioner instructed her counsel to amend the 
complaint from divorce to separate maintenance. That action was filed on the 11th day of August, 
1992. Respondent thereafter executed an Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which he agreed that 
the Court could enter an Order consistent with Petitioner's Complaint for Separate of Maintenance. 
On or about August 28, 1992, an Order for Separate Maintenance was signed and entered by the 
Court. 
14. Petitioner testified that prior to executing the Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, 
Respondent acknowledged to her that he had consulted with his attorney Brian Barnard, who 
suggested changes to the terms of the Complaint to bring the terms in compliance with recent 
changes in the law. As further evidence of Respondent's consultation with Mr. Barnard on the 
Divorce and then the Separate Maintenance action, Petitioner testified that Respondent told her that 
Mr. Barnard could not give her advice on a separate legal matter due to the pending action between 
the parties. On the stand, Respondent denied speaking to his attorney about the Order of Separate 
Maintenance. However, documentary evidence established that Respondent consulted at this time 
with Mr. Barnard about a divorce. Additionally, Respondent acknowledged that Brian Barnard had 
represented him in certain proceedings in the 1980's and further that Mr. Barnard represented him 
in this action commencing in 1998. The Court credited Petitioner's testimony and found it 
persuasive. Even if he had not, Respondent was intelligent enough and informed enough to know 
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that he could seek legal counsel prior to agreeing to the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
15. In the Order of Separate Maintenance, the Court ordered among other things: 
A. Petitioner and Respondent were awarded the joint legal custody of the 
parties' minor children. Petitioner was awarded sole physical custody, 
subject to the Respondent's right of liberal and reasonable visitation. 
B. Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per 
month until September 1992. From September 1992, through September of 
1993, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $500.00 per month as and 
for child support. This included his contribution for day care. Petitioner and 
Respondent were ordered to exchange income tax returns and income 
documentation beginning in 1993 and to recalculate in 1993, child support 
based upon the parties' incomes. 
C. Petitioner was ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children. Petitioner was further ordered to pay all 
routine medical expenses incurred for the children. However, each party was 
ordered to pay one-half (Vi) of any payment of extraordinary medical and 
dental expenses for the minor children. 
D. Beginning October 1,1993, Respondent was ordered to equally share in the 
child care expenses incurred by Petitioner related to her employment on or 
before the first day of each month. 
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E. The Court divided the debts between the parties, assigning to Petitioner an 
equitable share of the marital debts and to Respondent, his separate personal 
debts. ": ' 
F. Petitioner was awarded all right, title and interest in the residence, located at 
2869 Live Oak Circle, titled exclusively in her name because non-marital 
assets and a loan from Petitioner's mother were used to acquire the home. 
G. Prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, the parties sold the 
marital residence located at 318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties 
divided the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence in a fair and 
equitable manner and the Court approved the division. 
H. The Court divided the parties' motor vehicles and entered orders with respect 
to any debts owing thereon. 
L Petitioner was awarded all stocks or other securities in her name. Respondent 
was awarded the stock in his name. 
J, Petitioner was awarded all IRA's accounts and savings bonds in her name 
and the IRA account which was held jointly between the parties. 
K. Each party was awarded the retirement accounts in his or her own names. 
. L. Neither party was awarded alimony from the other. 
M. Various other orders were entered in the Order for Separate Maintenance 
which are not particularly significant to the actions therein. 
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16. At the time of the parties' separation in 1991, each of the parties had acquired marital 
and personal assets. Such assets include the following: 
A. In 1976, the parties acquired a marital residence and real property located at 
318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The family lived in this residence until 
approximately October, 1989, when Petitioner purchased the home on Live 
Oak Circle from separate funds. The parties moved into the Live Oak home. 
The parties attempted to lease the E Street home and were successful in doing 
so for a period of time. However, because they were unable to find reliable 
long-term tenants, the E Street home was vacant. When the parties separated 
in 1991, Respondent moved from Petitioner's residence on Live Oak Circle 
to the marital residence located on E Street. Even though Respondent was 
employed and had earnings with which to meet his own expenses after 
separation, Respondent failed to make the mortgage payments on the E Street 
residence where he was residing. In order to protect her credit, Petitioner was 
forced not only to pay the mortgage on her residence on Live Oak Circle, but 
likewise was forced to pay the mortgage obligation on the E Street residence 
during Respondent's tenancy. After many months of paying both mortgage 
obligations, Petitioner insisted that the E Street home be sold. Respondent 
ultimately agreed. Petitioner executed a Quit Claim Deed to the residence to 
Respondent and Respondent thereafter sold that property. From the sale of 
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the E Street home, Respondent, who acted as his own real estate agent, 
received gross proceeds in the amount of $48,000.00. Petitioner and 
Respondent agreed that Respondent could retain all proceeds from the sale, 
however Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner back for all the assets depleted 
by him without her knowledge or consent while they were living together. 
To satisfy this obligation, Respondent paid Petitioner the sum of $25,000.00. 
Respondent kept the remaining proceeds. He spent the proceeds on a lap top, 
car phone, clothing for himself, used some for living expenses and paid for 
business expenses including a school for cash flow management in San 
Diego, California for commercial real estate. The parties further agreed that 
because the Live Oak Circle was titled exclusively in Petitioner's name and 
because Petitioner had acquired this home using separate funds in the form 
of gifts from her mother and a loan from her mother, that it was fair and 
reasonable that Petitioner be awarded all right, title and interest in Live Oak 
Circle. 
B. During the course of the marriage, the parties each acquired retirement 
benefits through employment. Petitioner had acquired employment benefits 
through the U. S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired retirement benefits 
through his employment at KSL TV. The parties agreed that each would be 
awarded her or his own retirement benefits, subject to no claim in the other. 
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C. Routinely during the course of the marriage, Petitioner received various gifts 
and advances on her inheritance from her mother. She also received an 
inheritance from her uncle in 1993 or 1994. When she received such gifts 
and monies, Petitioner placed these funds into separate accounts titled in her 
name alone (in the form of savings accounts, CD's, IRA's, mutual funds, 
stocks and bonds.) These funds were never co-mingled with Respondent's 
property after the separation in 1991. The parties thereafter agreed that it was 
fair and reasonable that Petitioner retain as her separate property those 
accounts acquired primarily from these gifts and/or advances on her 
inheritance subject to no claim in Respondent 
D. Early in the marriage, Respondent assisted in meeting the family's financial 
needs and obligations. After 1989, Petitioner alone was forced to assume 
and discharge all of the marital indebtedness that had jointly acquired by the 
parties for the benefit of the family. Respondent paid none of these debts. 
At the time of the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, most of the 
joint marital indebtedness had been discharged by Petitioner. Petitioner was 
therefore only ordered to pay and hold Respondent harmless on the loan from 
her mother used as a partial down payment on the Live Oak home. 
Respondent had acquired various non marital debts, including obligations on 
two credit cards. These debts were not for a family purpose and were 
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exclusively incurred by Respondent for his own benefit. Respondent agreed 
to pay and hold Petitioner harmless from those debts. 
17. From 1991, until approximately end of 1993 or early 1994, the parties continued 
to live separate and apart. Respondent repeatedly represented to Petitioner that he was working very 
diligently to resolve his financial insolvency. Respondent repeatedly agreed or represented to 
Petitioner that he had filed or was preparing to file the state and federal returns for all years in which '•'"•" 
he had not. Respondent further continued to promise Petitioner that they would be able to reconcile 
at some point in the future because of the improvements that he had made in his life. Petitioner and 
Respondent again commenced with marital counseling trying resolve their differences. Respondent 
also sought individual counseling. On or about March 31,1993, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter 
in which he again represented that he was "going to work on changing patterns in my personal 
behavior that has been so damaging to our relationship". Respondent promised Petitioner that he 
would talk about problems between the parties and to not avoid them. He promised that he would 
do the things that he said he would do and do them in a timely fashion. He promised to pay his bills 
on time, including his taxes. He promised, further, to remain monogamous. In this letter, 
Respondent invited Petitioner to resume joint counseling to repair the relationship. Respondent 
proposed that the parties' potential reconciliation be a three step process. "1) burying past anger and 
resentment 2) renewing a courtship between us and 3) deciding on a remarriage." In response to 
Respondent's letter, Petitioner agreed to consider actual reconciliation if Respondent in fact followed 
through on his commitment he detailed in the letter. The end of 1993 or early 1994, Petitioner 
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learned that Respondent had lost his housing. Petitioner was concerned that Respondent would not 
be able to find suitable replacement housing. Petitioner agreed to allow Respondent to move back 
into her residence so that he could continue to work on the problems that led to the parties' initial 
separation. Petitioner hoped, for the sake of her children, Respondent would be able to meet all the 
commitments set forth in his letter of March 31, 1993. Both parties understood that just because 
Petitioner allowed Respondent to move into her residence, that such did not mean the parties had 
reconciled. According to the parties agreement, actual reconciliation would be accomplished by a 
remarriage. With that understanding, Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. 
18. While Respondent lived with Petitioner, he continued to work in his various 
occupations. Respondent was not a house husband. There was not a gender role reversal between 
the parties wherein Petitioner was the bread winner and Respondent was responsible for the home 
and children. Petitioner continued to be primarily responsible to attend to the children and all of 
their needs. Petitioner cleaned the house, did the yard work, did the laundry, grocery shopping and 
otherwise managed the household. Respondent did do small services for Petitioner. He painted a 
wall in the basement. He clipped and shredded refuse from the lawn on one occasion. He planted 
acorns to raise scrub oak trees. Respondent did do some chores around the house. Respondent did 
attend to some of the children's needs when he was not working. However, Petitioner could not trust 
Respondent to follow through with serious responsibilities and therefore did those herself. For 
example, Respondent wanted to be responsible to take the parties son Paul to school. In 24 days, 
Paul had 12 tardies. Petitioner resumed delivering the child to school herself. 
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19. In spite of the fact that Petitioner and Respondent resided under the same roof, the 
parties still lived under the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance; in that the parties' financial 
matters continued to be held separate from the other. Following the parties' separation in 1991, 
Petitioner had closed the parties' joint account and established her own separate checking account. 
Petitioner maintained the investments awarded to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance in 
separate accounts. All of the household obligations were in Petitioner's name; Respondent assumed * 
no liability for these. Petitioner and the children lived a modest lifestyle. However, Petitioner set 
aside further savings for the children's college and for her retirement in separate accounts. Petitioner 
continued to pay for her home. The Petitioner filed separate tax returns yearly as head of household, 
with the Respondent's knowledge. When Respondent moved into the residence, there was no 
formal agreement as to how much he would contribute to the household to offset the additional 
expenses for his residence in that home. Instead, Petitioner and Respondent agreed that he would 
pay $500.00 per month for child support as though the parties were living separately. Petitioner paid 
all of her liabilities for herself and the children and paid all bills with connection with the household 
20. Petitioner would not have allowed Respondent to live in her home without the 
protection of the Order of Separate Maintenance insulating her income and assets from Respondent's 
irresponsible financial behavior. Petitioner testified that on at least on a half dozen occasions, the 
parties specifically discussed the fact that the Order of Separate Maintenance was still in place, 
completely separating the parties assets and liabilities. Respondent told Petitioner, "The Order of 
Separate Maintenance is there for your and the children's protection". "I want you to feel 
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comfortable about money issues". Respondent never asked the Court to set aside the order because 
he knew his financial problems were not resolved and the Petitioner never asked that the order be 
lifted. Both parties relied on and implemented the provisions of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
For example, on one occasion, Petitioner attempted to obtain a home equity loan. When the 
mortgage company obtained a credit report on Petitioner, a bill owing to Sears incurred separately 
by Respondent appeared on her report. Respondent asked Sears to delete the credit report on this 
account, because he and Petitioner were living under an "Order of Separate Maintenance" and 
therefore, Petitioner could not be held liable for his debts. Because of the Order of Separate 
Maintenance, Sears deleted the negative credit report on Petitioner's credit for the obligation owing 
to them. Petitioner was then able to obtain a home equity loan in her own name. 
21. Even though Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $500.00 per month child support while 
he resided in her home from 1994 through September of 1997, Respondent only contributed 
$5,600.00 to the children's support during that time period. Respondent made no other financial 
contribution to the household. In fact, documentary evidence was admitted which substantiated the 
fact that Respondent himself did not believe he had an ongoing financial obligation to Petitioner's 
household and the children. In his Consumer Credit Counseling application, he did not list the 
Petitioner as his spouse. He did not list any family bills, any payments toward a rent or mortgage 
or even information regarding his obligation to his children. 
22. Even though he had promised Petitioner that he would become financially solvent after 
he moved in with her, Respondent continued to incur unnecessary indebtedness. Respondent failed 
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to pay his personal monthly obligations on a timely basis and debt collection summonses and 
subpoenas were delivered to the Respondent at the Live Oak address. Respondent's financial 
condition was so poor that he sought the assistance of Consumer Credit Counseling to help him meet 
his monthly obligations to his own personal creditors. Before his debts were paid off, Respondent 
terminated his relationship with Consumer Credit Counseling. Respondent continued to avoid filing 
of his tax returns. Respondent lead Petitioner to believe he had appointments with his accountant, 
that he was gathering the financial information, that the returns were going to be filed. To the best 
of Petitioner's information, Respondent had not filed taxes from 1990 to the present. Respondent 
borrowed money from Petitioner for his own needs. Each time, he promised he would pay her back. 
Respondent never did. Respondent acknowledged under oath that he never met the conditions 
agreed to for permanent reconciliation. In fact Respondent testified that doing so was still a "work 
in progress". Respondent liquidated his KSL retirement in 1993/1994 and dissipated the proceeds. 
Respondent acquired nothing from his income in terms of assets or cash to show from his 
employment. Respondent was not monogamous. He continued to date and have girlfriends while 
he lived with the Petitioner. 
23. Because of his failure to correct his behavior, Petitioner asked Respondent to 
move out. Respondent told Petitioner he did not have any money to move out. Petitioner loaned 
Respondent $1,800.00 to assist him in securing an apartment and another $3,000.00 to purchase a 
car for transportation. Petitioner believed that this was the last time she would have to pay 
Respondent money. Based upon Respondent's history of financial failure and irresponsibility, 
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Petitioner did not expect repayment of the loan. 
24. Petitioner filed again for divorce on October 7, 1997. Various orders were 
entered on a temporary basis. 
25. On or about March 19,1999, this Court entered its Bifurcated Decree of Divorce granting 
Petitioner a divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The financial issues raised in 
this matter were bifurcated for further hearing before the Court. 
26. Trial was held on May 30, 2000. The Court issued its ruling in open Court. Further 
proceedings were held on August 4, 2000, to clarify the Courts ruling. At the time of trial, 
Respondent did not dispute custody, child support, medical insurance, debt division, attorney's fees, 
distribution of Petitioner's IRA's, stocks, bonds or other investments outlined in her financial 
declaration. Respondent only contested the equity acquired in Petitioner's residence and division 
of Petitioner's retirement accounts with the US Postal Service. 
27. After trial, the Court made the following orders: 
A. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the remaining minor child subject to Respondent's right of reasonable 
visitation as the parties may agree but at a minimum, consistent with Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-35. 
B. Effective June 1, 2000, Respondent was ordered to pay to Petitioner child 
support in the sum of $270.84 per month which is consistent with the Utah Child 
Support Guidelines, using gross income from Petitioner of $5,000.00 and gross 
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income of Respondent of $2978.00. Respondent's child support obligation is 
payable one-half on the 5th and the remaining one-half on the 20th of each calendar 
month. Respondent's obligation should be ordered to continue until the minor child 
reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. ^" 
C. Petitioner should be ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the 
benefit of the child. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half of the child's per 
capita share of the entire premium. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half 
of the non-covered medical bills incurred by the Petitioner for the child. Petitioner 
should be ordered to provide proof at the end of each calendar month that she 
incurred a non-covered cost by providing a copy of her insurance explanation of 
benefits form. Respondent should be ordered to pay his one-half share within 30 
days of receipt. 
D. Due to the age of the remaining child, no further daycare will be incurred. 
E. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner incurred various 
debts and obligations which are detailed on her Financial Declaration which is filed with this Court. 
Because these debts were incurred by Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, 
they are separate debts. Petitioner should assume and discharge these debts and hold Respondent 
harmless therefrom. 
F. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent incurred various 
debts and obligations detailed on his Financial Declaration which is on file with this Court. Because 
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Respondent incurred this indebtedness after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, these 
debts are separate. Respondent shall assume and discharge these debts and hold the Petitioner 
harmless therefrom. 
28. Petitioner has acquired an interest in various IRA's, Stocks, bonds, and other investments. 
Petitioner shall be awarded all right, title and interest in the American Century IRA, the Smith-
Barney IRA, the Key Bank IRA, the Charles Schwab IRA, the Co Bank Investment, Mass Investors 
Gross Stock Fund A, AL Tel, RPM, Alliance Inc. Fund, National Auto Credit Inc., Transonic 
Company, Traveler's, CSX, American General Corp, Vanguard 500 Index Fund, American Century 
Ultra, Questar and Novell. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in these investments 
because they were principally gifted to her or acquired prior to entry of the Order of Separate 
Maintenance and because any contribution made thereafter, was made from Petitioner's separate 
funds. 
29. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in the residence located at 2963 Live Oak 
Circle. Petitioner shall discharge the indebtedness on this residence and shall hold Respondent 
harmless therefrom. The Court awards this property to Petitioner because it awarded this property 
to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance entered in 1992 and because any contribution to the 
equity since that time has been made from Petitioner's separate funds. 
30. Petitioner has continued to acquire an interest in various pension and retirement through 
her employment through the U.S. Postal Service. Petitioner was previously awarded those benefits 
which were accumulated prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance in 1992. Petitioner 
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is further awarded all right, title and interest in these accounts, which were accumulated after the 
entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Petitioner is awarded this as her separate property 
because she obtained these additional benefits through her separate funds. ^ 
31. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent acquired an interest 
in certain pension and retirement benefits through his employment at Continental Airlines. 
Respondent is awarded this property as his sole and separate property, having been acquired from 
his separate funds. 
32. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner acquired an interest in 
a savings and a checking account. Because those accounts were funded with separate funds from 
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner is awarded all right, title 
and interest in those accounts. 
33. Petitioner sought judgment against Respondent for all unpaid child support due to her 
after Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. The Court denies that Petitioner's request for 
judgment, finding that although Respondent only paid $5,600.00 of what would have exceeded 
$35,000.00 in child support obligation, the Court will not grant child support if the parties were 
residing under the same roof. However, Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner all unpaid child 
support from 1992 until he moved into Petitioner's house. Therefore, judgment of $11,500.00 
should enter against Respondent. 
34. Petitioner and Respondent were each ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its Conclusions of Law: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter herein. 
2. Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
between Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
become final upon signing and entry. 
3. Respondent did not contest the orders set forth in paragraphs 4-13 below, therefore, the 
Court concludes that such orders are fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
4. Petitioner shall be awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child 
to wit: PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of 
Visitation contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines 
to Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37. 
5. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is 
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $310.00 per month, which sum is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support 
obligations should be payable one-half (Vi) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half 
(Vi) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue 
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever 
occurs later. 
6. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred 
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Therefore, no ongoing order needs to be entered. 
7. Respondent's obligation to pay child support should be paid through Automatic Wage 
Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative fee 
imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding shall be collected from Respondent in addition '* 
to his base child support obligations. ^ % 
8. Effective June 1, 2000, Petitioner shall continue to be ordered to maintain a policy of 
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through 
her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent 
should each be ordered to pay one-half (14) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and 
dental insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half QA) share is $16.45. Petitioner and 
Respondent shall each be ordered to assume and pay one-half (lA) of all non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of 
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the 
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner shall be ordered to 
provide written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical 
and dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent should be ordered to pay 
his one-half QA) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of 
such documentation. 
9. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance 
policy on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor 
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child as the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent should each 
be enjoined and restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value 
of such life insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates 
from high school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and 
beneficiary status on or about January 15th of each calendar year. 
10. Petitioner shall be awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for 
purposes of filing of federal and state income tax returns. 
11. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis. 
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent should be awarded 
alimony either now or in the future. 
12. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property now in his or her 
possession. Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal 
property if he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing. 
13. Each party should be awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name. 
14. The Respondent contested at trial the legal effect of the Order of Separate Maintenance 
entered on or about August 28, 1992. 
15. In 1992 , Respondent was given a copy of the complaint for Separate Maintenance. 
Respondent did not contest the relief requested. Respondent voluntarily executed an Acceptance, 
Waiver and Consent, which gave the Court the authority to enter its orders consistent with the 
Complaint. 
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16. Respondent consulted with his attorney, Brian Barnard, regarding the proposed terms 
of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Respondent's execution of the Appearance, Waiver and 
Consent was knowing. *^ 
17. The Order of Separate Maintenance was the product of arms length negotiations between * 
the parties. '•*'' 
18. Respondent is an intelligent, well-educated man, who is able to read and understand the 
English language and could understand the terms of the Complaint for Separate Maintenance. 
19. No duress, coercion or trickery was employed to induce the Respondent to agree to the 
terms of the Separate Maintenance. 
20. The Order of Separate Maintenance, which distributed the parties' assets and allocated 
debts, among other things, appears to be a fair, equitable and permanent settlement of the parties' 
respective rights and obligations as they existed in 1991 and therefore, the order is res judicata as to 
the property settlement and other issues addressed in the order because it was a valid order. The 
Court will not redistribute property awarded under that order. Each of the parties received an 
equitable portion of the equity in the marital residence jointly acquired through the marriage. The 
proceeds from the home on E Street were av/arded to Respondent, provided that he paid to Petitioner 
the sum of $25,000.00 to restore certain funds which the Respondent had dissipated during the 
marriage. Respondent therefore received all of the equity in that residence. He cannot claim the 
order was unfair to him. He later spent these funds on personal items and not family expenses. 
Petitioner was awarded as her separate property the home located on Live Oak Circle. This home 
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was primarily acquired with separate funds, those being gifts and loans from Petitioner's family. 
Respondent made little or no contribution to this home and therefore, cannot claim the order was 
unfair to him. The Court entered its Order awarding each of the parties those retirement and pension 
benefits that she and he had individually acquired throughout the marriage. Petitioner had acquired 
benefits through her employment with the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired benefits 
through his employment and KSL TV. The division of retirement was not unfair to Respondent. The 
Court further awarded each party his or her separate property, received through gift or inheritance, 
which was un-commingled with the marital estate. 
21. The Order of Separate Maintenance further divided the existing debts between the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner. Petitioner was ordered to pay certain outstanding debts of the 
marriage. Respondent was ordered to pay only his personal liabilities. The order is not unfair to 
Respondent. 
22. All remaining orders in the Order of Separate Maintenance appear to be fair and 
reasonable and consistent with the law. 
23. Once the Order for Separate Maintenance was entered, the parties financial affairs were 
completely separated. Even though, Petitioner in 1993 or 1994, allowed Respondent to live under 
her roof, the parties did not intend to dissolve the protections given under the Order of Separate 
Maintenance. Both parties relied upon its provisions in conducting their financial affairs. The Court 
was never asked by either party to change the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Neither 
party petitioned the Court to terminate the obligations under the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
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Upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation, the Court could have modified 
or terminated the existing Order. However, under the evidence of this case, the Court finds, that the 
"reconciliation" was not permanent not complete as required. It was tentative, provisional and 
conditional based upon Respondent's promised performance to certain agreed conditions. Because 
Respondent did not meet the stated conditions, no voluntary or permanent reconciliation took place..._ 
24. From 1992 through 1997, the parties' had separate finances. The parties maintained no 
joint accounts. The parties did not maintain co-ownership of property or maintained joint 
obligations. Respondent did not acquire a further marital interest in Petitioner's property 
25. From 1992 to 1997, Petitioner met all of the needs of the household, including the minor 
children, from her separate income. Except that Respondent paid $5,600.00 as and for child support 
during that period of time. Petitioner retained these funds but the Court will not grant Petitioner 
further judgment for unpaid support during the time Respondent lived in the same house as the 
children. Judgment should enter against Respondent for unpaid support from May 1991 to 
December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves ruling on any other arrearage. 
26. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the 
Petitioner in the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
27. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in retirement funds acquired by 
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
28. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while 
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle should be denied. 
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29. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to assume and pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
30. Each party should be ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE 
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10) 
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as 
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of , 2001,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS O F -
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following: 
David Larsen 
341 S Main Ste 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8920 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio), ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
GARY THOMAS FACIO, ] 
Respondent. ] 
I SECOND AMENDED 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> CaseNo.924903403DA 
) JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
i Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 30 day 
of May, 2000. The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the 
evidence in this matter and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for good 
cause appearing, now therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between 
Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final 
upon signing and entry. 
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2. Petitioner is awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child to wit: 
PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded reasonable 
rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of Visitation 
contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines to™ 
Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37. ^ 
3. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is* 
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $310.00 per month, which sum is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support 
obligations should be payable one-half (14) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half 
(Vi) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue 
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever 
occurs later. 
4. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred Therefore, 
no ongoing order is entered. 
5. Respondent's obligation to pay child support is ordered to be paid through Automatic 
Wage Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative 
fee imposed to process Automatic Wage; Withholding are to be collected from Respondent in 
addition to his base child support obligations. 
6. Effective June 1,2000, Petitioner is ordered to continue to be ordered to maintain a policy 
of medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through 
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her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent 
are each ordered to pay one-half (!4) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and dental 
insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half (14) share is $16.45. Petitioner and 
Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay one-half (14) of all non-covered medical and dental 
expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of 
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the 
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner is ordered to provide 
written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent is ordered to pay his one-half 
(!4) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of such 
documentation. 
7. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance policy 
on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor child as 
the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent are each enjoined and 
restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value of such life 
insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high 
school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and beneficiary 
status on or about January 15th of each calendar year. 
8. Petitioner is awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for purposes 
of filing of federal and state income tax returns. 
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9. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis. 
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent are awarded alimony 
either now or in the future. 
10. Each party is awarded those items of personal property now in his or her possession. 
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal property if 
he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing. * 
11. Each party is awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name. 
12. The Court will not grant Petitioner further judgment for unpaid support during the time 
Respondent lived in the same house as the children. Judgment will enter against Respondent for 
unpaid support from May 1991 to December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves 
ruling on any other arrearage. 
13. Respondent is not awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the Petitioner 
in the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
14. Respondent is not awarded any fiirther interest in retirement funds acquired by Petitioner 
after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. 
15. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while 
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle is denied. 
16. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
17. Each party is ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the 
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Amended Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE 
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10) 
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as 
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court. 
DATED this day of ,2001. 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Second Amended Decree of Divorce 
Burge v. Facio Case No. 924903403 
Page 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the day of , 2001,1 caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Second Amended Decree of Divorce to be mailed to the 
following: 
David Larsen 
341 S Main Ste 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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